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Abstract
In response to growing concerns about the negative impact of GHG emissions,
several countries such as the European Union have adopted a cap-and-trade pol-
icy to limit the overall emissions levels. Alternatively, other countries including
Argentina, Canada, the United Kingdom, and United States have proposed an
intensity-based cap-and-trade system that targets emission intensities, measured
in emissions per dollars or unit of output. Arguably, intensity regulations can ac-
commodate future economic growth, reduce cost uncertainty, engage developing
countries in international efforts to mitigate climate change, and provide incentives
to improve energy efficiency and to use less carbon-intensive fuels.
This work models and studies a carbon tax scheme where policy makers set a
target emission factor, which is used as an intensity measure, for a specific industry
and tax firms if they exceed that limit. The policy aims to promote energy efficiency,
alleviate the impact on low emitters, and allow high emitters some flexibility to
comply. We examine the effectiveness of the policy in reducing the emission factor
due to manufacturing and transportation. The major objective of this research is
to provide policy makers with a decision support tool that can aid in investigating
the impact of an intensity-based carbon tax on regulated sectors and in finding
the tax rate that achieves a target reduction. Therefore, we first propose a social-
welfare maximizing model that can serve as a tool to evaluate the economic and
environmental impacts of the policy. We compare the outcomes of the intensity-
based tax and other existing environmental policies; namely, carbon tax imposed
on overall emissions, cap-and-trade systems, and mandatory caps using case studies
that are built within the context of the cement industry. The effectiveness of the
policy is measured by achieving a balance between the target emission factor and
the social welfare.
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To find the optimal tax rate that achieves a target reduction, we propose a
bilevel programming model where at the upper level, the government sets a target
emission factor for the industry and taxes firms if they exceed that target, and at
the lower level, the industry sets output levels that maximize social welfare. In
the design of the policy, the government takes into account the decisions of the
producers regarding fuel types and production quantities as well as the decisions
of the market regarding demand. To evaluate the effectiveness of the policy, we
build case studies in the context of cement industry. The policy is found to be
effective in reducing the CO2 emissions by opting for a less carbon-intensive fuel
with a little impact on social welfare. To examine the effectiveness of the intensity-
based carbon tax on reducing CO2 emissions from transportation, which is a major
supply chain activity, we finally propose a bilevel program where at the upper level
the government decides on the tax rate and at the lower level firms decide on the
design of their supply chain and truck types. The policy is found to be effective
in inducing firms to reduce their emission factors and consequently reducing the
overall emissions.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Global concerns are growing over climate change which is mostly attributed to the
high concentrations of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, especially carbon diox-
ide (CO2), in the earth’s atmosphere. CO2 is released naturally into the air from
natural processes and from the burning of fossil fuels. According to Treut et al.,
(2007), worldwide CO2 emissions have increased by about 35% since the Industrial
Revolution and are on trend to increase by 1.9% annually if no action is taken.
Breaking down worldwide CO2 emissions by sector reveals that the majority of
the world’s CO2 emissions in 2005 can be attributed to four end-use sectors: man-
ufacturing industry (38%), transportation (25%), households (21%), and services
(12%) (International Energy Agency [IEA], 2008). During the last three decades
the global industrial energy consumption has grown by 61%, making the sector one
of the major sources of GHG emissions; and consequently, one of the target sectors
to reduce CO2 emissions. About two-thirds of CO2 emissions from manufacturing
industries are attributed to six major manufacturing industries; namely, petroleum
refining, chemical production, iron and steel, cement, paper and pulp, and other
minerals and metals (IEA, 2007).
Global transport-related CO2 emissions in 2007 have increased by 45% from the
1990 level with road transport accounting for nearly three-quarters of the sector’s
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CO2 emissions. Given current trends, transport-related CO2 emissions are likely
to continue to rise by 40% above 2007 levels by 2030 if no action is taken (The
International Transport Forum, 2010). In Canada, the transportation sector is
responsible for about 24% of Canada’s GHG emissions, of which 79.4% are from
road transport (see Figure 1.1) (Environment Canada, 2013). Despite the fact that
Canada’s contribution to the world’s GHG emissions is about 2%, it is considered
one of the highest per capita emitters. Under the Kyoto Protocol, Canada has
agreed to reduce its 1990 emission levels by 6% by 2012. Yet, Canada’s GHG
emissions in 2008 exceeded 1990 levels by 24%, corresponding to an increase of
31.5% above the Kyoto target (Environment Canada, 2010).
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Figure 1.1: The contribution of economic sectors and transportation to Canada’s
GHG emissions
Given the anticipated future increase in CO2 levels and the growing concerns
about the negative impacts of GHG emissions, substantial efforts have been devoted
to limit the increase of CO2 concentration through market-based environmental
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policies. Stavins (2003) defines market-based mechanisms as regulations that rely
on market forces to encourage behavior; e.g., increasing the price of emissions-
intensive goods would decrease demand for such products and thus reduce emission
level. Policy makers can employ two market-oriented instruments to control GHG
emissions: a price-based mechanism (e.g., carbon tax) or a quantity-based pol-
icy (e.g., cap and trade) (Ramseur and Parker, 2009). An alternative approach
to market-based environmental policies is command and control mechanism which
relies on setting specific standards for firms to comply with environmental regula-
tions, often including technology and performance standards (Ma¨ler and Vincent,
2003). According to economic theory, market-based policies have the potential to
reduce GHG emissions at the least cost to society compared to using command and
control mechanism (Robb et al., 2010).
A carbon tax is a direct charge on CO2 emissions that requires companies to pay
fees proportional to their CO2 emission levels. In general, the tax policy provides
price stability, but the primary concern is the uncertainty of the emission level.
Thus, the government is interested in estimating the tax rate that achieves the
GHG emissions reduction target. In the literature, the proposed tax rates range
widely from $30/tonne of Carbon (tC) to $400 or more. Pizer’s (2002) simulation
results show that the cost of achieving the 1990 emission level by 2010 ranges
between $0 and $30. Cline (2006) reports that a meaningful cutback in GHG
emissions would target a 40% reduction in the early stages compared to 1990 levels
and rise to 50% by 2100. To achieve this reduction, a carbon tax should be about
$170/tC by 2005 and increased to $367 by 2055. Nordhaus (1993) estimates that a
carbon tax of $30/tC is expected to result in a reduction of 10 to 40% in emission
level. The challenge of determining a carbon tax rate lies in setting the lowest
tax rate that achieves the desirable long-term reduction in emission levels (Winkler
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and Marquard, 2009). Although firms are expected to take actions to reduce their
emission levels if the tax rate is higher than their marginal abatement costs, setting
the tax too high may cause financial difficulties. In contrast, setting the carbon
tax too low might be ineffective; e.g., some companies may decide to pay the tax
rather than investing in new technologies (Ramseur and Parker, 2009).
On the other hand the cap-and-trade program, one of the Kyoto Protocol out-
comes, can hold the emission level at a predetermined absolute target but the cost
of the program is uncertain. Under the cap-and-trade policy, governments issue a
limited number of carbon permits, each allowing its holder to emit one tonne of
carbon. Regulated entities holding carbon credits in excess of their emissions are
allowed to trade them in a secondary market (Koutstaal, 1996, and Paltsev et al.,
2007). Given the uncertainty surrounding economic growth, setting a cap on the
total emissions would limit the economic developments and increase the reduction
costs if the economic growth is higher than expected (Herzog et al., 2006). Moreover,
provided that the number of permits is fixed and the policy is inflexible in supplying
additional allowances, the permit price is likely to fluctuate. For instance, in the
European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme, carbon permit price has fluctuated
from e30/tC in 2008 to e8/tC in 2009 (Ramseur and Parker, 2009). Under per-
mit price volatility, planning investment in new technologies would present more
of a challenge for firms. The cap-and-trade policy would have negative impacts
on some industries if the cost of obtaining carbon permits or the cost of reducing
CO2 internally turns out to be higher than expected. Thus, policy makers would
have to weigh the benefits of holding emissions at a predetermined level against the
economic impact on the regulated sectors.
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1.1 Motivation
A variation of the cap-and-trade policy that sets a limit on the emission inten-
sity, measured in emissions per dollars or unit of output, is proposed in several
countries such as Argentina, Canada, the United Kingdom, and United States to
overcome some of the limitations of the aforementioned cap-and-trade system (Her-
zog et al., 2006). Under the intensity-based cap-and-trade scheme, firms reducing
their emission intensity below the target obtain credits that can be traded in a
secondary market (Rivers and Jaccard, 2010). Throughout this thesis, we use the
terms intensity and emission factor interchangeably to refer to CO2 emission per
unit produced. In 2007, the government of Canada introduced its national climate
change action plan, entitled Turning the Corner, to reduce the emission intensity
of pollution-intensive sectors and companies. The policy requires regulated enti-
ties to reduce their emissions per unit of production by 18% below 2006 levels by
2010 and to decrease their emission intensity by an additional 2% every subsequent
year. Emitters exceeding their intensity targets can comply by purchasing permits
from efficient firms or by contributing to a technology fund ($15/tC) (Environment
Canada, 2007 and 2008). Arguably, the emission-intensity cap-and-trade policy
can accommodate future economic growth, reduce cost uncertainty, encourage the
involvement of developing countries in climate change prevention, and provide in-
centives to improve energy efficiency and to use less carbon-intensive fuels (Herzog
et al., 2006, Jotzo and Pezzey, 2007, Pizer, 2005). However, a major criticism for
the policy is the uncertainty of the resulting emission level (Rivers and Jaccard,
2010).
Although one of the key drivers behind adopting the intensity cap-and-trade
policy is to reduce cost uncertainty, the effect of the policy on cost uncertainty is
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found to be ambiguous and depends on uncertain parameter values (Dudek and
Golub, 2003, Marschinski and Edenhofer, 2010, Newell and Pizer, 2008, Pizer,
2005, Webster et al., 2010). On the other hand, the carbon tax is argued to provide
predictable costs and is found to be preferable to quantity instruments for GHG
mitigation (Jotzo and Pezzey, 2007, Newell and Pizer, 2008, Pizer, 2002, Weitzman,
1974). However, most of the work on the intensity regulations has focused on the
intensity-based cap-and-trade policy with no attention paid to an intensity-based
carbon tax. Imposing a carbon tax on the emission factors would provide price
stability and help regulated entities in anticipating the costs of complying with
the target emission while providing them with a higher incentive to invest in new
technologies and thereby reduce their emission levels. The administration of the
policy is no more complicated than the administration of the intensity caps since
trading of carbon credits among firms is not allowed. However, in light of the
reviewed literature, models that examine the effectiveness of the policy seem to
be missing in the existing literature. There is a need for models that can aid
policy makers in investigating the impacts of such policy on regulated sectors and
estimating the tax rate that achieves a target reduction.
1.2 Research Scope, Objectives, and Contribu-
tion
This thesis models and analyses a carbon tax scheme based on the emission fac-
tor due to production or transportation activities. Specifically, we study a carbon
tax scheme where policy makers set a target emission factor for a specific industry
and tax firms if they exceed that limit. Emission factors vary by firm to reflect
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the differences in technologies and production or transportation efficiencies. Gen-
erally, firms can reduce their emission factors through investing in energy efficient
technology and cleaner fossil fuels or renewable energy sources and making some
operational adjustments. However, regulated entities would have to weigh the costs
of investing in carbon reduction technologies against the costs of obtaining carbon
credits. The key concept behind such a policy is to induce high emitters to reduce
their emission factors while alleviating the burden on low emitters. The policy
aims to provide firms with an incentive to invest in new technologies while allowing
them more flexibility to comply in case of unexpectedly high internal mitigation
costs. Therefore, the regulatory authority is interested in finding the tax rate that
achieves the target reduction with the least impacts on the industries.
The major objectives of this research are:
• Develop models for the intensity-based carbon tax that can aid in examining
the impact of the policy on regulated sectors.
• Investigate the impact of different tax rates on regulated sectors.
• Examine the effectiveness and the efficiency of the policy by comparing its
outcomes to those of other existing environmental policies.
• Find the optimal tax rate that achieves a target reduction.
The main contribution of this thesis is the modeling and analyses of an intensity-
based carbon tax where a mathematical model is presented to find the tax rate that
maximizes social welfare. We equally use the same modelling framework to model
other environmental policies such as carbon tax imposed on total emissions, cap-
and-trade systems, and mandatory caps to evaluate the proposed tax policy. In
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addition, we construct several case studies in the context of cement industry and
green supply chain design to test the proposed models.
The thesis has three main parts. In Chapter 3, we model and analyze an
intensity-based carbon tax that targets the production emission factor of manu-
facturing industries. We use the cement industry as a case study. Assuming a
competitive market with a linear demand curve, the chapter proposes a social-
welfare maximizing model that can serve as a tool to evaluate the economic and
environmental impacts of the policy. With some modifications, the model is appli-
cable to other manufacturing industries. The model can be used to assess the effects
of different tax rates on the industry-specific emission factors, the overall emissions,
the product price, and the social welfare. The chapter also shows how to modify
the proposed formulation to model other environmental policies; namely, absolute
carbon tax, cap-and-trade systems, and mandatory caps. The effectiveness of the
policy is measured by achieving a balance between the target emission factor and
the social welfare. To find the best tax rate, we solved the model for different tax
rates and picked the one that achieves the target reduction; however, this approach
does not find the optimal tax rate.
In Chapter 4, we formulate the problem of designing an intensity-based carbon
tax that targets the production emission factor, presented in Chapter 3, as a bilevel
programming problem. Designing effective environmental policies that reduce the
negative impacts of industries on the ecosystems cannot be undertaken in isola-
tion from the strategic and the operational decisions of the regulated entities. The
problem of designing a carbon tax can be viewed as a hierarchical process where
the leader, the government, determines the tax rate and the follower, the industry,
decides on production quantities and fuel types. Firms can reduce their emission
intensities by switching to less carbon-intensive fuels. The model is applied to
8
manufacturing industries represented by cement industry; however, with appropri-
ate modifications, the model can be applied to other manufacturing industries.
In Chapter 5, we propose an intensity-based carbon tax that targets the trans-
portation emission factor of multiple supply chains. The proposed model examines
the effect of the intensity-based carbon tax on designing supply chain networks
and selecting transportation modes. Each supply chain network consists of existing
suppliers, potential geographical sites for locating distribution centers (DCs), and
customer zones at fixed locations. Customers and suppliers are connected to DCs
by different types of trucks. Customer demand over a given long-term period is as-
sumed to be known. The primary source of CO2 emissions is fossil fuel combustion
for transport and electricity generation. Firms can reduce their emission factors by
changing the design of their supply chain networks, reducing shipment frequency,
and using electric trucks. The objective function of each supply chain is to min-
imize the total costs including the cost of carbon credits, whereas the regulatory
authority is looking for the minimum tax rate that achieves the target level.
1.3 Organization of the Thesis
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the ba-
sic features of some market-based instruments: cap and trade, carbon tax, and
intensity-based cap-and-trade policies and summarizes the literature related to the
intensity-based cap-and-trade policy. Chapter 3 presents a nonlinear programming
(NLP) formulation that maximizes social welfare under a carbon tax policy based
on the emission factor, describes how to modify the proposed formulation to model
other environmental policies, and describes a case study built within the context
of the cement industry. Chapter 4 proposes a bilevel formulation for designing a
9
carbon tax policy based on the production emission factor. Chapter 5 proposes
a bilevel formulation for designing a carbon tax policy based on the transporta-
tion emission factor. Chapter 6 concludes the thesis and discuses future research
directions.
10
Chapter 2
Related Background
The research conducted in this thesis draws upon the literature from two dis-
tinct disciplines: environmental economics and operations research (OR). Although
market-based policies put prices on carbon so companies take cost into account
when making decisions, there is little OR literature on incorporating environmen-
tal costs into companies’ strategic and operational decisions. An extensive literature
review by Benjaafar et al. (2010) highlights the absence of operations management
and operations research models that address issues related to carbon emissions
and operational and strategic decisions. Yet, considerable efforts have been made
to address sustainability and environmental impacts of supply chains, which we
will talk about it in more details in Chapter 5, (e.g. Cruz and Matsypura, 2009,
Nagurney and Yu (2012), and Sundarakani et al., 2010). On the other hand, a
significant amount of work had been performed on climate-change control policies
in the economics literature ( see Aldy et al., 2003, Anderson, 2008, Goers et al.,
2010, Newell and Pizer, 2008, Nordhaus, 1993, Pizer, 2002, 2005, Sue Wing et al.,
2006 ). Most of these attempts are centered on addressing issues related to the
efficiency of carbon tax, cap-and-trade, and intensity-based cap-and-trade policies.
Moreover, many discussion papers and reports investigate the design and the im-
plementation of each policy (Ramseur et al., 2009; Robb et al., 2010). Table 2.1
11
summarizes the focus of some of the work that has been reviewed in this chapter
and the next two chapters. This chapter provides an overview of the basic fea-
tures of four market-based instruments: cap and trade, carbon tax, hybrid, and
intensity-based cap-and-trade policies and summarizes the related literature in the
area of OR and environmental economics.
2.1 Carbon Tax
A carbon tax is a direct charge on CO2 emissions that obliges companies to pay
fees proportional to their CO2 emission levels. Currently, adopted carbon taxes are
applied to fossil fuels (e.g., coal, gasoline, and natural gas) based on their carbon
content. As a result, the cost of the fossil-fuel-based energy would increase and
consequently the cost of the energy-intensive products and services. The carbon tax
is intended to reduce CO2 emissions by creating an incentive to use less fossil fuels
and invest in renewable energy and low-carbon fuels. However, the key question
facing the regulatory authority is at what rate fossil fuels would be taxed (Ramseur
and Parker, 2009).
Since the early 1990s, several European countries, including Denmark, Finland,
Norway, and Sweden have adopted carbon taxes. At a later time, at the end of
1990s, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom have introduced
carbon taxes. However, the tax rates vary by country and differ among sectors
within a country (Hahn, 2009). Anderson (2008) examined the impact of carbon
taxes on six European countries and concluded that the carbon taxes reduced fuel
consumptions and consequently lowered the GHG emissions for the periods 1994
to 2004. North America’s experience in implementing carbon taxes is limited to
the ones introduced by two Canadian provinces: British Columbia and Quebec. In
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2008, British Columbia started the carbon tax at a rate of $10 per metric ton of
CO2 emissions and planned to increase it annually by $5 until it reaches $30 in
2012. Quebec imposed a low rate carbon tax of 0.8 cents per litre of gasoline and
0.93 cents per litre of diesel in 2007 (Duff, 2008).
Galinato and Yoder (2010) develop a constrained tax and subsidy regime to
tax energy sources with high emissions and use the revenue to subsidize energy
sources with low emissions. The proposed policy provides welfare gains relative
to a no-tax case. Gomes et al. (2009) evaluate the impact of a linear carbon tax
on new refinery configurations in Brazil. The optimum configuration is compared
before and after the tax using a linear programming model that minimizes the
production costs and the carbon tax. The model is solved under different fixed tax
rate each time. Results show that refineries reduce their emission levels when the
tax rate is higher than $100/tC. Benjaafar et al. (2010) integrates a linear carbon
tax into firms’ operational decisions using a single multi-stage lot-sizing model. The
objective function minimizes firm’s total costs including the CO2 emissions cost.
The results show that the carbon tax policy is a reliable mechanism for achieving
a quick reduction in emission level.
2.1.1 Design Considerations of a Carbon Tax Policy
Several decisions need to be considered when designing a carbon tax: (1) setting
the tax level; (2) the point of taxation; and (3) distribution of the tax revenue
(Aldy et al., 2008; Ramseur and Parker, 2009).
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Setting the Tax Level
As we mentioned earlier, setting the tax rate at a high level would induce some firms
to reduce their emission levels; however, it also could have costly effects on some
firms. To mitigate the impacts on industries, some countries such as Denmark,
Germany, and Sweden exempted some sectors or differentiated the tax rates across
sectors (Bo¨hringer and Rutherford, 1997). A gradual increase in the tax rate (slow
ramp-up) and baseline level exemptions (grandfathering) are alternative options
proposed to reduce the tax burden (Metcalf and Weisbach, 2008).
The Point of Taxation
In designing a carbon tax policy, policy makers have to determine which GHG emis-
sions and sectors would be regulated and where to impose the carbon tax in the
economy. Including all sectors would yield the maximum possible environmental
benefits; however, this would increase the implementation complexity. Hence, the
government has to balance the full-coverage benefits with the implementation costs.
To decide where to impose the carbon tax in the economy, the regulators can con-
sider three options: upstream where carbon enters the economy (i.e., coal mines),
downstream where GHGs are emitted (i.e., power plants), and a combination of
both (Ramseur and Parker, 2009).
Distribution of the Tax Revenue
Carbon taxes are likely to generate significant revenue. For example, in its first
year, the British Columbia carbon tax is anticipated to raise $880 million in 2010/11
(Duff, 2008). The carbon tax revenue can be used to fund various objectives such
as reducing other existing taxes and developing or subsidization of clean technology
15
(Ramseur and Parker, 2009).
2.2 Cap and Trade
Cap-and-trade mechanism is one of the Kyoto Protocol outcomes under which each
participant country commits to a reduction of at least 5% in its GHG emissions by
2012 relative to its 1990 level (Springer, 2003). Therefore, a regulatory authority
in each country determines which sectors are regulated by the program and sets
an emissions cap on the acceptable release of CO2 emissions in a specified period
(e.g., annually). Usually, the imposed caps are equivalent to the regulated entities
current emission level and is gradually reduced over time to reach the overall target
reduction (Goers et al., 2010). Following the emission level decision, in each period,
carbon caps are translated into a limited number of permits issued by government
regulating bodies. Each permit allows producers to emit one tonne of carbon and
remains valid until the holder burns a quantity of fossil fuels that contains one tonne
of carbon. Permit holders are allowed to trade their allowances in a secondary
market where firms who were able to reduce their emissions below the cap can
sell their credits to the ones who exceed their caps. At the end of each period,
companies are obliged to report their emission levels and to demonstrate sufficient
permits that cover their total emissions (Koutstaal, 1996, and Paltsev et al., 2007).
Early experience with a cap-and-trade policy to control pollution has begun in
the United States in 1995 to reduce sulfur dioxide (SO2) (Klaassen and Nentjes
1995). The implemented system succeeded in reducing SO2 emission level from 19
million tonnes in 1980 to 9 million tonnes in 2000. However, the existing cap-and-
trade systems for GHG emissions are still in their early stages. The world largest
carbon trading system is the European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-
16
ETS) which has been put into operation since 2005. The EU ETS covers about
46% of the European CO2 emissions from four broad sectors: building materials,
energy activities, ferrous metals, and pulp and paper (Ellerman, 2008; Hahn, 2009).
In the United States, the first mandatory cap-and-trade policy for CO2 emissions
is the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI). The program imposes a cap on
CO2 emissions from power plants in ten Northeastern and Mid-Atlantic states and
aims to reduce emission level by 10% by 2018 (Hahn, 2009). Other examples of
developed trading systems includes: Western Climate Initiative, California and the
west, and the Midwestern Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord (Hahn, 2009; Climate
Change, 2009).
Springer (2003) reviews 25 models of the market of GHG emissions permits.
The models are classified into four categories: emissions trading, macroeconomic,
integrated assessment, and the energy system models. All the results of the reviewed
models indicate the efficiency of the emissions trading program in reaching the
target reduction at the lowest cost to society. Szabo´ et al. (2006) develop a global
dynamic simulation model of the cement industry to quantify the effect of three
carbon trading markets, which differ in the geographical coverage of the emission
trading markets (EU15, EU27 and Annex B), on the cement industry. Results
indicate that the permit price decreases if the market enlarges to the EU27 or to
Annex B. Bra¨nnlund et al. (1998) compares the Swedish pulp and paper industry
profits with and without emissions trading. The results show that the industry can
achieve the same target reduction in emission level at a higher profit if an aggregate
emission level is used for the entire industry instead of individual levels.
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2.2.1 Design Considerations of a Cap-and-Trade Policy
The cost and the effectiveness of the cap-and-trade policy are determined by several
design decisions which include the first allocation of permits, coverage and the point
of regulation, safety valve, and banking and borrowing of permits. These elements
are discussed below.
Initial Allocation
A key decision in designing the cap-and-trade policy is the first distribution of per-
mits to regulated entities. The most common alternatives for initial allocation are
grandfathering, auctioning, or a combination of both. If governments employ the
grandfathering approach, carbon permits would be freely allocated to companies
based on their past emission levels (Goers et al., 2010). Although the grandfa-
thering procedure could help in reducing the impact of the program on firms and
consumers, it could result in some windfall profits. The initial phase of EU ETS re-
quired the participating countries to auction at most 5% of the carbon permits. As
a result, the Germany based RWE which is one of Europe’s largest carbon emitters,
collected windfall profits of about $6.4 billion (Goeree et al., 2009). Alternatively,
companies can bid to purchase carbon permits. The auctioning procedure elimi-
nates windfall profits and generates revenue that could be used to investment in
low-carbon technology or to reduce tax burdens. However, in a high competitive
environment, auctioning could hurt the business of some firms who lack the fund
to buy permits. A combination of grandfathering and auctioning might overcome
each policy’s disadvantages (Climate Change, 2009).
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Coverage and the Points of Regulation
Primary decisions in designing a cap-and-trade policy is deciding what sectors and
GHG emissions are covered by the program and the point of regulation. Some
programs such as RGGI focuses on power generation, whereas EU-ETS includes
other sectors such as iron, steel, glass, oil, coal mines, natural gas, refineries, and
cement. The proposed approaches regarding the point of regulation range from
upstream where fossil fuels enter the economy (e.g., oil wells and coal mines) to
downstream where GHG emissions are emitted (e.g., manufacturer). Choosing
the point of regulation has been influenced by many factors such as monitoring
emissions and the administrative complexity. Upstream regulation is considered to
be more efficient when emissions cannot be easily or cheaply monitored (Ellerman,
2008).
Safety Valve
In order to control price volatility of carbon permits, policy makers can design
a cap-and-trade policy that allows for supplying unlimited additional permits at
a fixed price known as the trigger price. Companies who exceed their caps can
buy the required credits from the government if the market price of the emissions
allowances exceeds the trigger price. This safety valve provides flexibility for the
regulated sectors to comply with the imposed caps and places an upper bound on
the allowance price. However, since the safety valve allows for exceeding the caps,
achieving the target reduction would be unguaranteed (Ellerman, 2008; Paltsev et
al., 2007).
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Banking and Borrowing of Permits
A cap-and-trade policy can be designed to allow for banking and borrowing mech-
anisms which add flexibility to the system and reduce the program cost. Banking
refers to the ability to save excess credits to use in future periods, whereas borrow-
ing involves using future year’s allowances in the current period. With the banking
option, the cumulative emissions at any point will not exceed the issued permits
even if the system allows firms to shift their obligations across periods (Stavins,
2003; Paltsev, 2007). The borrowing mechanism has been implemented in the EU-
ETS and limited to using the next period allowances. On contrast, banking has
been successfully implemented in the U.S. in the context of SO2 trading system
(Ellerman, 2008).
2.3 A Comparison between Carbon Tax and Cap-
and-Trade Policies
Carbon tax and a cap-and-trade systems are both market-based environmental poli-
cies that place a price on carbon. Although the design and the implementation of
the carbon tax and the cap-and-trade policy demonstrate some similarities in terms
of the point of regulation, there are some differences between the two policies which
lie in the source of uncertainty. The carbon tax policy controls the carbon price
but the emission levels remain uncertain, whereas the cap-and-trade policy caps
the emission level but the cost is uncertain. While each policy has its supporters,
both policies are argued to possess some advantages and disadvantages that are
summarized in Table 2.2 (Climate Change, 2009; Ellerman, 2008; Ramseur and
Parker, 2009).
20
Carbon Tax Cap-and-Trade
1-Provide a stable price.
Hence, predictable costs can
help in planning the investment
in new technologies.
1-Imposes a direct cap on GHG
emissions. Thus, the target
reduction would be achieved
if the policy implemented cor-
rectly.
Advantages 2-Easier to implementation be-
cause of the existing tax collec-
tion rules.
2-Encourages the development
of cleaner technologies.
3-Raise revenue that can be
used to finance several objec-
tives.
3-Proves its effectiveness in re-
ducing other pollutant such as
sulfur dioxide and nitrogen ox-
ides in the U.S.
1-Would yield uncertain emis-
sions levels.
1-Potential windfall profits
with free allocation.
2-Would face political chal-
lenges because of the word
“tax.”
2-Price is very likely to fluctu-
ate.
Disadvantages 3-Would receive less support
from industries and environ-
mental groups.
3-The program may lose its
ability to control emissions if
too many permits are issued.
4-Implementation complexity;
the efficiency of the program
depends on the accuracy of
monitoring emissions.
Table 2.2: Advantages and disadvantages of carbon tax and cap-and-trade system
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The efficiency and the effectiveness of both policies are investigated and analyzed
in the literature. Weitzman (1974) analyzed price and quantity polices and provided
conditions in which each instrument would lead to the best social welfare outcome.
If the marginal benefit curve is relatively flat, Weitzman’s analyses demonstrate that
a tax policy would be preferred over the quantity policy. In contrast, Weitzman’s
analyses show that a quantity policy is suitable when the marginal cost curve is
relatively flat. Newell and Pizer (2008) and Pizer ( 2002 and 1999) find that the
marginal costs of reduction are relatively steeper than the marginal benefits leading
to favouring a carbon tax over a cap-and-trade policy. Wittneben (2009) supports
Exxon Mobil’s Chairman and CEO Rex Tillerson statement that favour carbon tax
policy over cap-and-trade policy. The author lists seven differences between the two
market-based policies and argues that carbon market constructed under the Kyoto
Protocol and EU ETS failed to reduce emission level albeit the high costs of the
program. Pizer (2002) analyzes the social welfare associated with tax and cap-and-
trade policies and show that the tax system is more efficient than the cap-and-trade
system by a factor of five. Pezzey (2003) compares the long run efficiencies of three
views about the initial allocation of emissions permits under the trading system
and the exempted emission level under the emissions tax system. The analyses
show that the emissions tax with a grandfathering achieves the long run efficiency
if the baseline is treated as property right; i.e., existing firms get the exemption
right but any new firm does not. However, the paper calls for further investigation
before adopting this policy. Lund (2007) evaluates the cost impacts of EU ETS
on energy-intensive manufacturing industries. The results show that the highest
impact is on steel and cement industries which is found to be 3-4 fold compared to
the impacts on oil refining and pulp and paper industries. Therefore, the author
suggests considering some correcting mechanisms to alleviate the impacts on some
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industries; for example, using different taxation schemes.
2.4 Hybrid Policies
To utilize the advantages of the cap-and-trade policy and the carbon tax, hybrid
policies were proposed in the literature. One such policy is the safety valve which
sets an upper bound on permits prices. Essentially, the system works as a trading
system until the trigger price is reached, then the system changes to a carbon tax
with a fixed price (Goers et al., 2010). Pizer (2002) examines the efficiency of using
the trigger price and concludes that the hybrid policy is slightly more efficient
than the emissions tax. However, both policies are more efficient than the trading
system which makes the hybrid policy an attractive alternative to either carbon
tax or cap-and-trade policy. Lee et al. (2008) examines the effects of combining a
carbon tax policy with a cap-and-trade policy on several industry sectors in Taiwan.
A fuzzy goal programming model is used to simulate the potential reduction in CO2
emissions. The permits price is determined by the marginal reduction cost which
is calculated by introducing the carbon tax to the fuzzy goal programming model.
Adopting the hybrid system is found to be more efficient than using the carbon tax
alone.
2.5 An Intensity-Based Cap and Trade
The intensity-based cap-and-trade policy is a variation of the cap-and-trade policy
which sets a limit on the emission intensity, measured in emissions per dollars or
unit of output. Firms reducing their emission intensity below the target obtain
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credits that can be traded in a secondary market (Rivers and Jaccard, 2010). Reg-
ulations limiting the emission intensity are introduced in Argentina, the United
Kingdom, and United States (Herzog et al., 2006). In 2007, the government of
Canada introduced its national climate change action plan, entitled Turning the
Corner, to reduce the emission intensity of pollution-intensive sectors and compa-
nies. The policy requires regulated entities to reduce their emissions per unit of
production by 18% below 2006 levels by 2010 and to decrease their emission inten-
sity by an additional 2% every subsequent year. Emitters exceeding their intensity
targets can comply by purchasing permits from efficient firms or by contributing to
a technology fund ($15/tC). Since the focus of the policy is to encourage the adop-
tion of cleaner production technology, firms will not be given credits for shutting
down production for economic reasons or moving the production out of Canada.
Given that firms cannot comply with the regulation by simply reducing their pro-
duction quantities, the policy would provide an incentive for firms to improve their
production processes (Environment Canada, 2007 and 2008).
Intensity regulations have been advocated as a means to accommodate future
economic growth, reduce cost uncertainty, provide incentives to improve energy
efficiency, and engage developing countries in the international efforts to mitigate
climate change (Herzog et al., 2006, Jotzo and Pezzey, 2007, Pizer, 2005). Yet,
a major criticism for the policy is that it would allow overall emissions to rise as
production increases (Rivers and Jaccard, 2010). The literature on intensity reg-
ulations focuses primarily on evaluating the intensity-based cap-and-trade policy
in terms of its impact on the overall emissions, performance under uncertainty,
impact on companies’ competitiveness, and ability to integrate with other exist-
ing environmental policies. Bruneau and Renzetti (2009) investigate the Canadian
government’s proposed policy in light of historical trends between 1990 and 2002.
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The results indicate that targeting emission intensity would push Canadian com-
panies to reduce their emission intensities; however, the overall emissions will be
higher than 1990 levels. Kim and Baumert (2002) conclude that the total emissions
with intensity regulations is uncertain; however, the intensity-based policies make
the mitigation of GHG emissions feasible and efficient by reducing cost uncertainty
and facilitating the participation of developing countries in the international efforts
to combat climate change. Kolstad (2005) examines the intensity regulations and
concludes that in order to achieve a meaningful reduction in GHG emissions, the
emission intensity must be decreased by a rate that is equal to the growth rate of
GDP.
Pizer (2005) finds that the intensity-based policies accommodate future eco-
nomic growth especially for developing countries and relatively not difficult to ad-
minister but not the best policy to handle cost uncertainty. Jotzo and Pezzey
(2007) find that optimal intensity target reduce cost uncertainty, achieve higher
expected welfare, and perform better than absolute target. Fischer and Springborn
(2011) employ a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to compare three
environmental policies: a carbon tax, an emission cap, and an intensity target. The
results show that although the intensity targets allow for economic growth when
compared to the tax and the cap policies, the carbon tax has the lowest welfare
cost. However, the volatility levels of the output are lower with the absolute target,
higher with the carbon tax, and the same as the no environmental policy case with
intensity target. Ellerman and Sue Wing (2003) study the effect of the absolute and
the intensity cap-and-trade policies on costs and emissions when the future GDP
is uncertain. The analyses show that the reduction cost is uncertain under both
policies because the uncertainty in GDP translates in either uncertainty in emission
intensity or total emissions depending on the used policy. Sue Wing et al. (2006)
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find that a small GDP variance and high correlation between emissions and GDP
are required in order to favour intensity caps over absolute caps, a conclusion that is
shared by Quirion (2005) and Newell and Pizer (2008) based on maximizing social
welfare. Quirion (2005) compares the expected welfare under three environmental
policies: a cap on the total emissions, a cap on the intensity of emissions, and a
price instrument (tax or subsidy). In most cases, the expected welfare obtained
under the cap on the total emissions or under the price instrument is found to be
higher than the one obtained under the intensity target. Newell and Pizer (2008)
extend Weitzman’s (1974) work to compare intensity caps and absolute caps and
find that neither policy dominates the other. Webster et al. (2010) build on the
Weitzman’s (1974) model to compare the intensity targets to hybrid policies and
show that a high correlation between GDP and emissions favours intensity targets.
Rivers and Jaccard (2010) employed a dynamic general equilibrium model to
evaluate three environmental policies: emission intensity, cap-and-trade, carbon
tax. The analysis suggests that the emission-intensity policy could have less impact
on the international competitiveness of the regulated entities if the environmental
policies of other countries are less aggressive. Furthermore, the results imply that
the emission intensity policy has some advantages over the cap-and-trade policy
and the carbon tax if there are pre-existing tax distortions and only some sources
of emissions are regulated. Kuik and Mulder (2004) assess the impacts of three
trading schemes: trading under absolute caps, trading under intensity caps, and
trading under mixed caps. The results demonstrate that the intensity caps have
less negative impact on the competitiveness of the regulated entities, but it needs
to be combined with other environmental policy, such as energy tax, in order to
achieve a certain reduction. Fischer (2003) examines the effects of allowing trading
of emission permits between two sectors: one is regulated by an intensity cap
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and the other is regulated by an absolute cap. The results indicate that in the
absence of cross-price effect, allowing trading between the two sectors increases
the combined emissions. Marschinski and Edenhofer (2010) use some criteria to
assess potential merits of intensity caps including compatibility with other existing
trading systems, reducing cost uncertainty, ease of implementation, and providing
incentive to innovate. The analyses show that the effect of the intensity caps on
the cost uncertainty is ambiguous and trading between the absolute cap and the
intensity cap would increase the permit price. Dudek and Golub (2003) argue that
the intensity targets have no advantages over the absolute targets based on some
criteria including reducing cost uncertainty, ease of implementation, and providing
incentive to innovate.
2.6 Summary
From the preceding review of market-based environmental policies, several key
points can be concluded. First, although the intensity cap-and-trade policy is
advocated as a tool to reduce cost uncertainty, the effect of the policy on cost un-
certainty is found to be ambiguous and depends on some parameter values such
as the correlation between emissions and GDP (Marschinski and Edenhofer, 2010,
Newell and Pizer, 2008, Pizer, 2005, Sue Wing et al., 2006, Webster et al., 2010).
Second, while the carbon tax is argued to provide predictable costs and is found
to be preferable to quantity instruments for GHG mitigation, most of the work on
the intensity regulations has focused on the intensity cap-and-trade policy with no
attention paid to a carbon tax based on the emission intensity. Third, the cap-
and-trade policy increases business risk and consequently the risk of bankruptcy
if the compliance costs turn out to be higher than expected. Fourth, operations
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research models that address the design of climate-change control policies seem to
be missing in the existing OR literature.
We attempt to address some of the previous points in the next chapters. In
Chapter 3, we propose a social-welfare maximizing model that can serve as a tool
to evaluate the economic and environmental impacts of the intensity-based carbon
tax. In Chapter 4, we propose a bilevel formulation to find the optimal tax rate
that achieves a target reduction. In Chapter 5, we propose a bilevel formulation
to examine the effectiveness of the intensity-based carbon tax on reducing CO2
emissions from transportation.
28
Chapter 3
Modeling and Analysis of an
Intensity-Based Tax Policy
In this chapter we model and analyze a tax policy based on the emission factor,
which is used as an intensity measure. Specifically, we model a situation where
policy makers set a limit on the production emission factor of a regulated industry
and tax firms if they exceed that limit. We evaluate the efficiency of the policy
against other existing environmental policies using a social welfare mathematical
programming model. In particular, we are interested in assessing the impacts of
the intensity-based carbon tax and other environmental policies on the emission
factors, overall emissions, product price, productions, consumers’ and producers’
surpluses, and social welfare. We test the proposed models on two case studies that
are built within the context of the cement industry. In Section 3.1, we present a
nonlinear programming (NLP) formulation that maximizes social welfare under the
intensity-based carbon tax and show how to modify the proposed formulation to
model other environmental policies. In Section 3.2, we describe a case study built
within the context of the cement industry. In Section 3.3, we discuss the results of
the case studies and provide policy recommendations. In Section 3.4, we summarize
the chapter.
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3.1 Problem Formulation
We consider a polluting industry with N firms producing a single homogeneous
product, qi, and generating CO2 emissions in proportion to their output levels.
CO2 emissions are primarily due to burning fossil fuels to produce energy that is
required for production. Each firm i = 1, ..., N requires a certain amount of energy
bi to produce a single unit of output. Thus, the amount of fossil fuels required by
firm i to produce a quantity qi is
L∑
l=1
bˆilwil = biqi,
where l is the index of fuel types, wil is the amount of fuel l used at firm i, and bˆil
is the energy content in fuel l when used by firm i (GJ/tonne, m3, ...). Please refer
to the Appendices for notation used throughout this thesis.
CO2 emissions can be calculated using emission factors which convert energy
consumption (in energy units: kilowatt hour (kWh), or British thermal unit (BTU))
to the associated CO2 emissions. A CO2 emission factor of production is an average
value that reflects the level of CO2 emissions per unit of production. Hence, the
production emission factor, xi, of firm i can be calculated as
xi =
total CO2 emissions
total production
The production emission factors vary by firm to reflect the differences in pro-
duction efficiencies and technologies. When the source of CO2 emissions is fossil
fuels, the total CO2 emissions is given by
L∑
l=1
eilwil, where eil is the CO2 emission
factor of fuel type l at firm i. Therefore, the production emission factor of firm i is
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xi =
L∑
l=1
eilwil
qi
(3.1)
Policy makers are interested in reducing the production emission factor of a
specific industry by designing effective and efficient carbon tax that reaches the
target reduction at the least cost. Assuming that regulatory bodies set a target
production emission factor for the industry, β, use an output-based allocation, and
freely allocate each firm certain number of carbon credits, βqi, a regulated firm is
required to pay tax only if its production emission factor exceeds the target (see
Figure 3.1). Therefore, firm i pays α2qi(xi − β) if its emission factor xi exceeds β,
where α2 is the tax rate. Hence, the CO2 emissions cost for firm i is:
g(xi) =
0 for 0 ≤ xi ≤ βα2qi(xi − β) for xi > β. (3.2)
Emission cost
Emission Factorβ
xi
g(xi)
Figure 3.1: Emission Cost
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The problem faced by the government is to determine the optimal tax rate
that induces firms to reduce their emission factors and consequently reduces the
emission factor of the industry to the target level. We consider a competitive
market whose inverse demand curve is given by p = γ − δqd, where γ and δ are
the intercept and the slope of the inverse demand function, respectively, and qd is
the demand corresponding to price p. We assume that each firm has a production
capacity limit, di, and the firm’s production cost function is convex quadratic of
the form Ci(qi) = ciqi + tiq
2
i , where ci and ti are known constants. Firms can
reduce their emission intensities by using less carbon-intensive fuels. The fuel cost
of firm i is given by
L∑
l=1
hilwil, where hil is the variable cost associated with using
fuel wil. Given the market price and the carbon tax, firms would like to determine
production levels and fossil fuel types that maximize their surplus. On the other
hand, the government agency seeks to evaluate the impact of the tax rate on the
emission factor of the industry, the total CO2 emissions generated by all firms in
the industry, the demand, the product price, the social welfare, and the cost of
reaching a certain production emission factor.
The equilibrium model of a competitive market where consumers and producers
are price takers can be represented by combining two models that maximize the con-
sumers’ and the producers’ surplus as well as the market clearing condition (Gabriel
et al., 2012, Hazell and Norton, 1986). The producer’s surplus maximization model
for firm i is:
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max pqi −
L∑
l=1
(ciqi + tiq
2
i + hilwil)− g(xi) (3.3)
s.t. qi ≤ di (3.4)
L∑
l=1
bˆilwil = biqi (3.5)
xiqi =
L∑
l=1
eilwil (3.6)
qi, wil, xi ≥ 0 l = 1, ..., L (3.7)
The objective function (3.3) maximizes the surplus of firm i which is a profit
measure, the difference between the revenue from selling products to consumers
and the variable production cost, the variable fuel cost, and the CO2 emission cost.
Constraint (3.4) is the production capacity limit. Constraint (3.5) is the energy
balance. Constraint (3.6) calculates the CO2 emission factor. Constraints (3.7) are
the nonnegativity constraints.
From (3.2) and (3.6), the taxed CO2 emission level can be represented by the
maximum of (
L∑
l=1
eilwil−βqi, 0). Defining θi = max(
L∑
l=1
eilwil−βqi, 0), the CO2 emis-
sion cost for firm i can be represented as α2θi. Therefore, the surplus maximization
problem for each firm i can be written as
[PSi]: max pqi −
L∑
l=1
(ciqi + tiq
2
i + hilwil)− α2θi
s.t. qi ≤ di
L∑
l=1
bˆilwil = biqi
θi ≥
L∑
l=1
eilwil − βqi (3.8)
qi, wil, θi ≥ 0 l = 1, ..., L
After solving the model and obtaining the values for wil and qi, equation (3.1)
is used to calculate the emission factor of firm i.
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The consumers problem is
[CS]: max
qd≥0
γqd − 1
2
δ(qd)2 − pqd
which maximizes consumers’ surplus, the difference between the amount of money
that consumers are willing to pay for products and the revenue paid to the firms
(Baron and Myerson, 1982, and Gabriel et al., 2012). Given that p = γ − δqd,
the consumers’ surplus can be also written as γqd− 1
2
δ(qd)2− (γ − δqd)qd, which is
equivalent to 1
2
δ(qd)2.
The market clearing condition is
qd −
I∑
i=1
qi ≤ 0 (3.9)
which ensures that the total demand of the industry is satisfied.
The equilibrium model of a competitive market can be formulated as the fol-
lowing social-welfare maximization problem that maximizes the sum of consumers’
and producers’ surpluses, subject to the constraints of the consumers and the pro-
ducers as well as the market clearing condition (3.9). After solving the problem,
the market price can be retrieved from the dual variable of the market clearing
constraint (Gabriel et al., 2012).
[SW]: max γqd − 12δ(qd)2 −
I∑
i=1
L∑
l=1
(ciqi + tiq
2
i + hilwil)−
I∑
i=1
α2θi (3.10)
s.t. qi ≤ di i = 1, ..., N
L∑
l=1
bˆilwil = biqi i = 1, ..., N
qd, qi, wil, θi ≥ 0 i = 1, ..., N, l = 1, ..., L
θi ≥
L∑
l=1
eilwil − βqi i = 1, ..., N
qd −
I∑
i=1
qi ≤ 0
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3.1.1 Modeling other Environmental Policies
To evaluate the effectiveness of the tax policy based on the emission factor, we
compare it to other market-based environmental policies, namely, carbon tax based
on the total emissions, and cap and trade based on the total emissions and based on
the emission factors. In addition, we compare the proposed policy to non-market-
based environmental regulations such as setting specific caps on the emission factors
and on the total emission. In what follows, we show how [SW] can be modified to
model such policies.
• Carbon tax based on total emissions: when facing a carbon tax on the
total emissions, constraints (3.8) are removed from [SW] and the objective
function is replaced by
max γqd − 1
2
δ(qd)2 −
I∑
i=1
L∑
l=1
(ciqi + tiq
2
i + hilwil)− α2
I∑
i=1
L∑
l=1
(eilwil)(3.11)
• Cap on the emission factor: if the firms face a cap on their emission
factors, we can model that by removing constraints (3.8), adding constraints
L∑
l=1
eilwil ≤ βqi i = 1, ..., N (3.12),
where β is the target production emission factor for the industry, and replacing
the objective function by
max γqd − 1
2
δ(qd)2 −
I∑
i=1
L∑
l=1
(ciqi + tiq
2
i + hilwil) (3.13)
• Cap on the total emissions: when firm i operates under a cap on its total
emissions, we can model that by removing constraints (3.8), replacing the
objective function by (3.13), and adding the following constraints
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L∑
l=1
eilwil ≤ µi i = 1, ..., N (3.14)
where µi is a cap on the total emissions of firm i which is usually set as a percentage
of its historical emission level.
• Cap-and-trade policy based on the total emissions: in order to model
this policy, constraints (3.8) are removed, and the following constraints
L∑
l=1
eilwil ≤ µi + Ei i = 1, ..., N (3.15)
are added, where Ei is the quantity of carbon credits purchased or sold by firm i.
Note that Ei could be positive or negative depending on whether carbon credits
are bought or sold. Given that carbon credits are exchanged at the same price,
the objective function is replaced by (3.13). Moreover, since firms are selling and
buying credits from each other, the constraint
I∑
i=1
Ei = 0 is added to balance the
amount of carbon credits traded.
• Cap-and-trade policy based on the emission factors: To model this
policy, constraints (3.8) are removed, the objective function is replaced by
(3.13) since carbon credits are exchanged at the same price, and
L∑
l=1
eilwil ≤ βqi + Ei i = 1, ..., N (3.16)
I∑
i=1
Ei = 0
are added.
Under the two cap-and-trade policies, the objective function of firm i is given
by pqi −
L∑
l=1
(ciqi + tiq
2
i + hilwil)− α2θi − p¯Ei , where p¯ is the permit price which we
set it equal to the tax rate and use it to calculate each firm profit or cost. If firm i
is a seller, p¯Ei calculates its profit from selling carbon permits and if it is a buyer,
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p¯Ei calculates its cost. Given that carbon credits are exchanged at the same price
p¯
I∑
i=1
Ei, the costs and the profits from carbon trading cancel each other, therefore;
(3.10) is replaced by (3.13).
3.2 Case Study
In order to test the proposed models, we construct a small and a large case studies
in the context of the cement industry. Cement manufacturing is one of the world’s
most energy intensive industries, with an estimated global CO2 contribution of
5% (Worrell et al., 2001). In Canada, the contribution of cement industry to the
GHG emissions of the emissions-intensive and trade-exposed industries in 2011
is about 13% (see Figure 3.2) (Environment Canada, 2013). Generally, cement
manufacturing involves four major steps: raw material extraction, raw material
preparation, clinker production, and the finished product making (see Figure 3.3).
The production of cement begins by extracting limestone, sand, and clay from
quarries and crushing the extracted materials to a specialized size. The obtained
raw materials are mixed with additional minerals, to achieve a specific chemical
composition, finely ground, and fed into a rotating kiln in which the intense heat
allows the mixture to be heated to about 1500
o
C. The process causes a chemical
reaction, calcination, where CO2 is released and raw materials are transformed into
an intermediate product, clinker, that is ground to make cement (Ruth et al., 2000,
Worrell et al., 2001). Kilns are usually fuelled by carbon-intensive fossil fuels such as
coal, petroleum coke, fuel oil, and natural gas. The CO2 emissions emitted during
the clinker production and combustion of fossil fuels make the clinker manufacturing
the most carbon-intensive production step. Electricity is mostly consumed during
the preparations of the raw materials and the final product (Worrell et al., 2001).
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Figure 3.2: The contribution of economic sectors and cement industry to Canada’s
GHG emissions
In Canada, the cement industry consists of 17 plants with 15 operated by eight
companies, producing 98% of Canadian cement. In 2006, the total production of
the industry is reported to be more than 14.3 million tonnes mostly concentrated
in Ontario and Quebec (Natural Resources Canada, 2009). In 14 plants, kilns are
fuelled by coal, petroleum coke, or a combination of both which are carbon-intensive
fossil fuels as reported in 2008. Analyzing the electric energy efficiency of 15 plants
shows that the efficiency index, which is the amount of electric energy used in
cement plants, varies from 36-138, the worst plant has an index of 36 (Natural
Resources Canada, 2009). According to the International Energy Agency report
(2007), the CO2 emission factor associated with the production of one tonne of
cement in Canada for the years 2003− 2004 is 0.85 tonne.
To calculate the energy required for production at firm i, constraints (3.5) are
replaced by
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Quarrying Raw Materials & Crushing Preparation of Raw Materials
Preheater
Raw Meal Silo
Cement Silo
Raw Mill
Production of Clinker Grinding & Distribution of Cement
PrecalcinerRotary KilnCoolerCement Mill
Clinker Silo
Figure 3.3: Cement production process
L∑
l=1
bˆilwil = aibiqi (3.17),
The right-hand side in (3.17) calculates the total amount of energy required by
firm i to produce cement from clinker, where ai (t-clinker/t-cement) is the clinker
to cement ratio at firm i, bi (GJ/t-clinker) is the energy required by firm i to
produce clinker, and qi is the quantity produced of cement (tonne). The left-hand
side calculates the total amount of energy provided by the various fuels, where bˆil
is the energy content in fuel l when used by firm i (GJ/tonne, m3, ...). In general,
energy consumption in the cement kiln differs depending on the kiln type and the
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process type (e.g., wet, dry, ...) (Worrell et al., 2001).
In addition to the CO2 emissions,
L∑
l=1
eilwil, emitted from combustion of fossil
fuels to produce cement, estimating cement production emission factor involves
three CO2 emission factors: (1) an emission factor due to calcining limestone to
produce clinker, si (t-CO2/t-clinker), (2) an emission factor due to grinding raw
materials, ξi (t-CO2/t-raw-material), (3) and an emission factor due to grinding
cement, ξˆi (t-CO2/t-cement) (Ruth et al., 2000). The CO2 emissions emitted during
the clinker production is related to calcining the limestone and combustion of fossil
fuels. Electricity is mostly consumed during the preparations of the raw materials
and the final product (Ruth et al., 2000). A CO2 emission factor of production in
the cement industry can be calculated as follows.
xi =
L∑
l=1
eilwil + siaiqi + ξiaˆiaiqi + ξˆiqi
qi
(3.18),
where aˆi (tonnes of raw meal/t-clinker) is the raw material to clinker ratio at firm
i. The first term in (3.18) is the total CO2 emissions from the combustion of fossil
fuels to fire the cement kilns, whereas the second term is the CO2 emissions released
from calcining the limestone. The third and forth terms are the CO2 emissions
due to electricity consumed to grind raw materials and final product. Defining sˆi
as aisi + ξiaˆi + ξˆi, the production emission factor can be written as
xi =
L∑
l=1
eilwil
qi
+ sˆi
Therefore, the taxed CO2 emissions of firm i is
θi = max(
L∑
l=1
eilwil + (sˆi − β)qi, 0).
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3.3 Results and Discussion
In the small case study, we consider three firms: high, average, and low emitters.
We assume that firms can use coal, petroleum coke, and natural gas to fuel kilns.
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 show the parameters used in the case study. bi are selected to
be in the range of the average energy consumption per tonne of clinker produced
in Canada for the year 2003-2004 as reported in the International Energy Agency
report (2007), whereas the clinker-to-cement ratio is the one reported in the same
report for the year 2003-2004. sˆi are selected to give an emission factor that is in the
range of the one reported in the International Energy Agency report (2007) for the
Canadian cement industry. For the inverse demand function p(qd) = γ−δqd, γ and δ
are set to 376 and 0.0376 respectively. Assuming that the regulating authority aims
for a 12.5% reduction in the industry-specific emission factor which is equivalent
to 0.73 t-CO2/t-cement, we are interested in finding the best tax rate α2 that
achieves this target. To find the best α2, we fix the value of α2, solve the resulting
NLP for several different values of α2, and pick the smallest one that achieves
the target reduction β for the entire industry. The resulting emission factor of the
industry is calculated as
I∑
i=1
L∑
l=1
(eilwil + sˆiqi)/
I∑
i=1
qi, and the best α2 is the one that
induces the industry to have an emission factor (
I∑
i=1
L∑
l=1
(eilwil + sˆiqi)/
I∑
i=1
qi) ≤ β.
The resulting NLP formulation is implemented in GAMS and solved using MINOS.
In order to compare the proposed policy to other environmental policies using our
case studies, we subtract α2
I∑
i=1
sˆiqi from (3.11), and add sˆiqi to the left-hand side
of (3.12), (3.14), (3.15), and (3.16).
The aim of this chapter is to evaluate the efficiency of the tax policy based on the
emission factor by comparing it against other existing environmental policies. We
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Fuels Variable Energy Emissions
costs factor
wil hl ($/t, 100m
3, ..) bˆl (GJ/t, 100m
3, ..) el (t CO2/t, 100m
3, ..)
Coal 100 32.1 2.457
Petroleum coke 50 23.3 2.53
Natural gas 11 3.72 0.29
Table 3.1: Parameters used in the case study for fuels
Firms Production costs Capacity Energy Emissions Ratio Cap on the total
ci ($/t) ti di bi (GJ/t) sˆi (t CO2 /t) ai emissions µi
A 22 0.001 3000 6 0.5 0.95 2832
B 26 0.001 3000 4.5 0.4 0.95 2143
C 29 0.001 3000 3 0.2 0.95 1275
Table 3.2: Parameters used in the case study for firms
can classify these policies into policies targeting total emissions (absolute): carbon
tax, absolute cap-and-trade, and absolute mandatory cap, and policies targeting
emission factors: intensity-based cap and trade and mandatory cap on the emis-
sion factor. We start by solving [SW] without any environmental regulation and
present the results in Table 3.3. The results of this part show that all firms use
petroleum coke to fuel kilns. The high emitter, firm A, has the highest emissions
and production quantities and generates the highest profit. We then solve [SW]
for different tax rates and pick the one that achieves the target reduction in the
industry-specific emission factor. Figures 3.4 and 3.5 present the emission factor,
the total emission and the social welfare, respectively, of the industry for different
tax rates. From Figure 3.4, we can see that a tax rate of $27 yields an emission
factor of 0.721 or a 13.3% reduction in the emission factor which is 0.8% lower
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Firms Industry
A B C
Emission factor 1.119 0.864 0.509 0.832
Total emissions (tC) 3356 2540 1512 7409
Production (tonne) 3000 2939 2986 8908
coal 0 0 0 0
Fuel used% pet coke 100% 100% 100% 100%
N. gas 0 0 0 0
Emission Traded (tC) − − − −
Product price − − − 41.05
Emission cost 0 0 0 0
Profit/Producers’ surplus 11463 8641 8812 28917
Consumers’ surplus − − − 1491881
Social welfare − − − 1520798
Table 3.3: Results of the small case study under no environmental regulations
than the target level. This emission factor corresponds to an emission level of 6250
tonne or 15.6% reduction in the overall emission. For the comparisons, we use
the resulting reduction level in the emission factor, 13.3%, as a target for policies
targeting emission factors and the resulting reduction level in the total emissions,
15.6%, as a target for polices targeting overall emissions. Tables 3.4 and 3.5 present
the results of solving [SW] under different environmental policies using the target
reductions. Table 3.4 shows the percentage changes in the emissions, productions,
fuels, and profits of each firm, whereas Table 3.5 displays the percentage changes
in the social welfare, consumers’ and producers’ surpluses, product price, the total
production, the total emissions, and the emission factor of the industry. Figures
3.6-3.10 present the results of solving [SW] under environmental policies for either
different tax rates or different reduction targets depending on the policy. The next
subsections analyze the obtained results in detail.
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Policy Firms Changes in Emissions% Changes in Fuel used% Emission Changes in Emission
Factor Total Production% coal pet coke N. gas cost Profit% Traded
Tax on the emission A 0 −10.73 −10.73 0 100 0 27082 −37.43 −
factor, α2 = 26, B 0 2.05 2.08 0 100 0 10467 179.04 −
C 0 1.06 0.47 0 100 0 0 294.38 −
Tax on the emission A −15.64 −24.85 −11.00 0 0 100 15456 −37.78 −
factor, α2 = 27, B −15.16 −13.43 2.08 0 0 100 264 186.58 −
C 0 1.06 0.47 0 100 0 0 304.03 −
Tax on the total A 0 −26.70 −26.73 0 100 0 63970 −57.82 −
emissions, B 0 2.05 2.08 0 100 0 67407 145.76 −
α2 = 26 C 0 1.06 0.47 0 100 0 39738 456.96 −
Tax on the total A −15.64 −38.86 −27.60 0 0 100 55404 −58.82 −
emissions, B −15.16 −13.43 2.08 0 0 100 59394 152.01 −
α2 = 27 C −17.09 −16.27 0.47 0 0 100 34196 474.40 −
Cap on the A − − − − − − − − −
emission factor B − − − − − − − − −
C 0 1.06 0.47 0 100 0 − 7562.87 −
Cap on the A 0 −15.6 −15.67 0 100 0 − 492.86 −
total emissions B −10.65 −15.6 −5.51 0 29.27 70.73 − 646.01 −
C −16.50 −15.6 0.47 0 3.27 96.73 − 691.91 −
Cap and trade A −15.64 −24.94 −11.10 0 0 100 16065 −40.63 595
based on the B −4.98 −3.03 2.08 0 67.14 32.86 8100 180.75 300
emission factor C −17.09 −16.27 0.47 0 0 100 0 504.13 −895
Cap and trade A −2.23 −28.75 −27.17 0 85.77 14.23 0 597.92 −441
based on the B 0 2.09 2.08 0 100 0 12123 803.16 449
total emissions C −17.09 −16.27 0.47 0 0 2298 0 849.26 −8
Table 3.4: Comparing different environmental policies for the small case study
(firms)
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Figure 3.4: The emission factor and the overall emission for different tax rates
3.3.1 Total Emissions and Emission Factors
This subsection examines the impacts of different environmental policies on the
total emissions of the industry, which is the collective CO2 emissions of all firms, as
well as the percentage contribution of each firm to the total emissions. In addition,
in this subsection we discuss the impacts on the emission factors of the industry
and the firms.
Observation 1: A significant increase in the tax rate imposed on the emission
factor does not always result in a significant reduction in the emission factor.
Figure 3.4 reveals that increasing the tax rates significantly can sometimes yield
small reductions in the emission factor. For example, while a tax rate of $27 achieves
an emission factor of 0.721 corresponding to a reduction of 13.3%, a tax rate of $60
is required to obtain an emission factor of 0.71 which corresponds to a reduction of
14.6%. On the other hand, Figures 3.4 and 3.5 show that a small increase in the tax
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Figure 3.5: The social welfare level for different tax rates
rate can sometimes yield a slight decrease in the social welfare level; however, the
reduction in the emission factor and the emission level are significant. For instance,
Table 3.5 demonstrates that while increasing the tax rate from $26 to $27 reduces
the emission factor and the total emission by a further 12%, the impact on the
social welfare is about 0.06%.
Observation 2: Using the same tax rates, the reductions in total emissions
and the emission factor achieved under a carbon tax imposed on total emissions are
higher than the ones achieved under a carbon tax imposed on the emission factor.
For instance, after solving [SW] with different values for α2, we found that the
best tax rate that achieves the target reduction in the industry-specific emission
factor is $27. Table 3.4 shows that using a tax rate of $27 induces high and average
emitters to switch to natural gas, which achieves the target level for the production
emission factor and yields a 15.6% reduction in the total CO2 emissions. On the
47
other hand, when we solve [SW] under the policy that imposes a tax on the total
emissions to find the tax rate that achieves this emission level, we find that a tax
rate of $26 reduces the emission level by 11%, whereas a tax rate of $27 reduces
the emission level by 25% which is higher than the reduction achieved by imposing
a tax on the emission factor. Figure 3.6 illustrates that for different tax rates the
reductions obtained in the total emissions and the emission factor are higher when
the carbon tax are imposed on the overall emissions. However, decision makers need
to be aware that imposing a carbon tax on the total emissions has more negative
impacts on the quantity produced, the product price, the consumers’ surplus, and
the social welfare as shown in the next subsections.
Observation 3: Using a tax rate that achieves a target reduction reduces the
emission costs.
Under a tax on the emission factor, Table 3.4 shows that although using a tax
rate of $26 reduces the emissions of the high emitter by 10.73%, it does not provide
an incentive to switch to less carbon-intensive fossil fuels. The table demonstrates
that the high emitter reduces its emission by reducing its production quantity.
Comparing the emission costs of the average and high emitters with tax rates $26
and $27, the table shows that their emission costs are higher with the lower tax
rates due to their high emissions. Similarly, with a tax on the total emissions, a tax
rate of $26 does not induce firms to reduce their emission to the target reduction
which leads to higher emission costs compared to imposing a tax rate of $27 on the
total emissions. Assuming that the price for the carbon credits is $27, similar to
the tax rate, Tables 3.3 and 3.5 present the emission costs under the cap-and-trade
policies which reveal that the emission cost under the intensity-based cap and trade
is higher because the quantity of carbon credits traded is higher.
Observation 4: Imposing a cap on the emission factor would put some firms
48
out of business resulting in the highest reduction in total emissions and emission
factors. In contrast, policies imposing a cap on total emissions result in the lowest
reduction in the emission factor.
Figure 3.6 shows that as the cap on the emission factor becomes stricter, the
reduction achieved in the total emissions becomes higher because of driving some
firms out of the market. For instance, Table 3.4 illustrates that requiring each
firm to reduce its emissions factor to the target level, 0.721, puts the high and the
average emitters, firms A and B, out of business. As a result, there is a significant
reduction in the emission factor and the total emissions. In contrast, imposing a cap
on the emission factor and allowing firms to trade carbon credits provide regulated
firms with some flexibility to comply and achieve adequate reduction in the total
emissions without putting some firms out of business. Table 3.4 demonstrate that
the low emitter, firm C, reduces its emission factor and sells the extra carbon credits
to the high and the average emitters, firms A and B, which kept them in the market.
In addition to buying carbon credits, the average emitter uses natural gas along
with petroleum coke, and the high emitter switches to natural gas to reduce their
emission factors.
Table 3.5 illustrates that although there are four policies that achieve the same
reduction in the total emissions, 15.6%, the reductions in the emission factors ob-
tained under the policies imposing a cap on the total emissions with and without
trading are inferior to the reduction obtained under the intensity-based carbon tax
and under the intensity-based cap and trade. The reason is probably due to the
higher reduction in the total production under the policies that impose a cap on
the total emissions. Table 3.4 shows that both policies imposing a cap on the total
emissions induce firms to use natural gas along with petroleum coke. The table
also demonstrates that, under a cap-and-trade based on the total emissions, the
49
high and the low emitters reduce their emission levels below the caps and sell the
extra carbon credits to the average emitter.
Observation 5: Tax policies and a policy imposing a cap on the emission
factor reduce the percentage contribution of the high emitters to overall emissions
and increase the percentage contributions of the low and average emitters to overall
emissions.
Figure 3.7 displays the percentage contribution of each firm to the total emis-
sions of the industry under different environmental policies. The reductions in the
emission levels of the high emitter under carbon taxes and with a cap-and-trade
based on the total emissions are due to the change in fossil fuel types and the reduc-
tion in the production quantities, whereas the reduction under the policy imposing
a cap on the emission factor is due to putting the high emitter out of business.
In contrast, the increase in the emission level of the low emitter is attributed to
production increases. The figure also illustrates that the highest contribution of
the high emitter to the total emissions is found to be with no environmental reg-
ulations and under a cap on the total emissions which requires all firms to reduce
their emissions by the same percentage; consequently, their contribution to the total
emissions stay the same.
3.3.2 Production and Market Price
This subsection examines the changes in the quantity produced by each firm, the
total production of the industry which is the collective production of all firms, and
the product price under different environmental policies.
Observation 6: An intensity-based carbon tax and an intensity-based cap and
trade have the least impact on total production and product price. On the other
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Figure 3.7: Total emissions of regulated firms under different environmental policies
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hand, imposing a cap on the emission factor has the most negative impact on the
total quantity produced and the product price.
Table 3.5 and Figure 3.8 show that all environmental policies result in a re-
duction in the total productions which leads to an increase in the market price.
However, the table and the figures reveal that a tax on the emission factor and a
cap-and-trade based on the emission factor lead to the least reduction in the total
production and the least increase in the market price because they allow firms some
flexibility to reduce their emission intensity. Firms can reduce their emissions ei-
ther by switching to less carbon-intensive fuels, reducing production, or paying for
extra carbon credits. This flexibility allows firms to comply with the least impact
on the production and the product price. For instance, Table 3.5 shows that under
a cap-and-trade based on the emission factor, requiring the industry to reduce its
emission factor by 13.3% decreases the total production by 2.71% and increases the
product price by 22%. These results are slightly inferior to those obtained under the
tax based on the emission factor which decreases the total production by 2.67% and
increases the market price by 21.75%. Under these two policies, the reduction in
the total production can be attributed to the decrease in the quantity produced by
the high emitters and the capacity constraints on the low and average emitters. On
the other hand, Table 3.5 shows that under a cap on the emission factor, requiring
the industry to reduce its emission factor by 13.3% decreases the quantity supplied
into the market by 66.32% and increases the product price by 541%. The reason
for this significant reduction in the total production is pushing some firms out of
the market due to their inabilities to meet the target.
Observation 7: Imposing a mandatory cap on total emissions without trad-
ing has a lower impact on the total production and the market price compared to
imposing a cap on total emissions with trading although the differences between the
53
impacts of the two policies are not significant.
Table 3.5 demonstrates that placing a cap on the total emissions of each firm
reduces the the total production by 6.7% and increases the product price by 54.9%,
whereas imposing a cap on the total emissions combined with trading decreases
the total quantity produced by 8.1% and increases the product price by 66.2%.
This can be attributed to the fact that some firms can benefit from selling carbon
credits more than selling the product so they reduce their emissions beyond the cap
by reducing productions.
Observation 8: Although all the environmental policies lead to a reduction in
the market share of the high emitter and an increase in the market shares of the
low and average emitters, the largest reduction is obtained under a carbon tax on
the total emissions, whereas the largest increase is obtained by imposing a cap on
the emission factor.
Figure 3.9 shows the changes in the market share of each firm under different
environmental regulations which indicate a decrease in the market share of the high
emitter and an increase in the market share of the low and the average emitters. The
low emitter obtains the largest market share under a cap on the emission factor
and the smallest market share with no environmental policies, whereas the high
emitter benefits from no environmental regulations and obtains the largest market
share. Under environmental policies, the high emitter has the smallest market share
under a carbon tax on the total emissions due to the high emission cost and out
of business under a cap on the emission factor which leads to an increase in the
market shares of the low and average emitters. For instance, imposing a tax of
$27 on total emissions reduces the market share of the high emitter from 33.6% to
26.5% and increases the market share of the low emitter from 33.3% to 36.7%. In
contrast, requiring a reduction of 13.3% in the industry emission factor puts the
54
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high emitter out of business and increases the market share of the low emitter from
33.3% to 50%.
3.3.3 Social Welfare and Consumers’ and Producers Sur-
pluses
Observation 9: The least impact on social welfare is found to be with policies that
impose a cap on total emissions with and without trading, an intensity-based cap
and trade, and an intensity-based carbon tax.
Figures 3.6 and 3.10 illustrate that adequate reduction in CO2 emissions can
be achieved with a little impact on social welfare under policies that impose a cap
on total emissions with and without trading, a cap on the emission factor with
trading, and a tax on the emission factor. Yet, Figure 3.10 indicates that policies
imposing a cap on the total emissions would provide slightly higher social welfare
compared to the intensity-based carbon tax and the intensity-based cap and trade.
For example, if the industry is required to reduce its total emissions by 15.6%,
Table 3.5 shows that imposing a cap on total emissions with trading yields the
lowest reduction in the social welfare which is about 1.28%, followed by a cap on
total emissions without trading providing a reduction of 1.38%. The intensity-
based policies: cap and trade and carbon tax decrease the social welfare by 1.59%
and 2.62%, respectively. Given that the policies imposed on total emissions have
more negative impacts on consumers’ surplus compared to the two intensity-based
policies, their low impacts on the social welfare are probably due to the high increase
in the producers’ surplus. The highest reduction in the social welfare, 44.47%, which
is due to the high reduction in consumers’ surplus, is obtained with a mandatory
cap on the emission factor.
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Figure 3.9: Market share of regulated firms under different environmental policies
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Observation 10: The intensity-based carbon tax and the intensity-based cap
and trade lead to the least impact on the consumers’ surplus.
Figures 3.8 and 3.10 show that a tax on the emission factor and a cap-and-trade
policy based on the emission factor yield the highest production quantities and
the lowest market price among the environmental policies which lead to the least
reduction in the consumers’ surplus. Figure 3.10 also demonstrates that imposing
a cap on the emission factor has the most negative impact on consumers’ surplus.
This reduction in consumers’ surplus results from putting some firms out of business
and decreasing total production. Table 3.5 shows that for the imposed target
reductions, the tax on the emission factor and the cap-and-trade policy based on the
emission factor decrease the consumers’ surplus by 5.26% and 5.33%, respectively,
whereas the cap on the emission factor without trading reduces the consumers’
surplus by 88.66%.
Observation 11: Although all the environmental policies increase producers’
surplus, the highest increase is found to be with a mandatory cap on the emission
factor.
Table 3.5 and Figures 3.8 and 3.10 show that all environmental policies increase
the market price and generate higher profits for the industry. However, the cap on
the emission factor provides the highest producers’ surplus because it puts some
firms out of business, decreases the total production, and increases the product
price. Under a tax on the emission factor, the profit of the industry increases by
133% due to the increase in the product price. Table 3.4 shows that with a tax on the
emission factor, the average and low emitters, firms B and C, benefit from this policy
and make more profit compared to the case with no environmental regulations. In
contrast, the high emitters, firm A, makes less profit due to the reduction in the
production quantity and the cost of CO2 emissions. To calculate the profit of each
58
firm under the two policies that allow for carbon trading, we assume that the price
for the carbon credits is $27, similar to the tax rate. Although the price for the
carbon credits is assumed to be the same, the profits of the industry and all the
firms are higher under the cap-and-trade based on total emissions compared to
using the cap-and-trade policy based on the emission factor, which is probably due
to the higher product price. Table 3.5 illustrates that the high emitter generates
the highest profit with no environmental regulations and the lowest profit under
the tax on the total emissions due to the high emission cost and the reduction in
the quantity produced by the high emitter. On the other hand, the low emitter
benefits from environmental regulations and generates higher profits because of the
increase in the market price and its market share.
3.3.4 Large case study
Table 3.6 compares the percentage changes in the social welfare, the consumers’ and
the producers’ surplus, the product price, the total production, the total emissions,
and the industry emission factor, under different environmental policies using a
larger case study involving 12 firms: four high emitters, five average emitters, and
three low emitters. The industry has a lower emission factor compared to the small
case study, so we assume that the decision maker wants to reduce the emission
factor by 10% which can be achieved by imposing a carbon tax of $27/tC. The
results match those for the small case study which suggest that a reduction in the
emission factor would lead to a reduction in the total emissions. For instance,
reducing the emission factor by 10% reduces the overall emissions by 11.64%. The
intensity-based carbon tax and the intensity-based cap and trade have the least
impacts on the total productions, market price, and consumers’ surplus. On the
other hand, the results indicate that imposing a cap on the emission factor puts
59
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some firms out of business and significantly reduces the quantity produced and
consumers’ surplus. If trading takes place, the cap-and-trade policy based on the
total emissions has the least impact on social welfare, but the policy significantly
impacts consumers’ surplus.
3.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we propose a model of a tax policy based on the emission factor
where policy makers set a limit on the production emission factor of a regulated
industry and require firms to pay tax if they exceed that target. Using a social
welfare maximization model, we test the policy on two case studies constructed in
the context of the cement industry and compare the results to other environmental
policies. Unlike the major criticism of the intensity-based regulations, which is that
the total emissions would increase even if the target level for the emission factor is
met, our analysis indicates that a reduction in the emission factor would lead to a
significant reduction in the total emissions. Yet, our study show that using a low
tax rate would results in no reduction or a minimal reduction in the emission factor
and the total emissions. Average and low emitters benefit from the intensity-based
carbon tax by supplying higher quantities and making higher profits.
Comparing the carbon tax based on the emission factor to other environmental
policies, we found that the policy has more advantages: (1) it yields the highest
consumers’ surplus and production quantities and the lowest market price; (2) it
provides social welfare that is significantly higher than the ones obtained under the
mandatory cap on the emission factor and under the carbon tax based on the total
emissions; (3) it provides adequate reduction in CO2 emissions with a little impact
61
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on social welfare; (4) it provides a stable price for carbon credits. Although the
social welfare under the intensity-based carbon tax is found to be slightly inferior
to the ones obtained from the cap-and-trade policies, trading among firms may not
take place due to the volatility of permit prices. Therefore, the industry will operate
under mandatory caps on the total emissions or on the emission factor which would
put some firms out of business, decreases the total production, and increases the
product price.
To find the best tax rate, the proposed model is solved for different tax rates,
and the smallest one that achieves the target reduction in the industry-specific
emission factor is picked. Due to the fact that finding the optimal tax rate has a
great impact on the effectiveness of the policy, in the next Chapter, we propose a
bilevel model to find the best tax rate.
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Chapter 4
A Bilevel Programming Approach
for Designing an Intensity-Based
Tax Policy
1In Chapter 3, we model an intensity-based carbon tax and examine its impacts on a
regulated sector using a social-welfare maximizing model. To find the best tax rate,
we solve the model for different tax rates and pick the one that achieves the target
reduction; however, this approach does not find the optimal tax rate. Due to the fact
that finding the optimal tax rate has a great impact on the effectiveness of the policy,
in this chapter we propose a bilevel formulation to determine the optimal tax rate
that achieves the desired trade-off between the target emission factor and the social
welfare. The problem of designing a carbon tax based on the emission factor can be
viewed as a hierarchical process where the leader, the government, determines the
tax rate and the follower, the industry, decides on production quantities and fuel
types. In the design of the policy, the government considers the decisions of the
1The material in this chapter has been published in H. Almutairi and S. Elhedhli, ”Carbon tax
based on the emission factor: a bilevel programming approach”, Journal of Global Optimization,
2013, DOI: 10.1007/s10898-013-0068-8
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producers regarding fuel types and production quantities as well as the decisions
of the market regarding demand. This chapter is organized as follows. Section
4.1 provides an overview of some important properties of a bilevel programming
problem and its applications. Section 4.2 presents a bilevel formulation for designing
a carbon tax policy based on the emission factor. Section 4.3 discusses the results
of two case studies. Section 4.4 provides concluding remarks.
4.1 Background
4.1.1 General Formulation and Terminology
A Bilevel programming problem (BLPP) describes the hierarchical structure of
a system with two independent decision makers, most probably with conflicting
objectives, acting non-cooperatively (Gu¨mu¨s and Floudas, 2001). Thus, BLPP
consists of an optimization problem in the upper level, usually referred to as the
leader’s problem, constrained by a second optimization problem in the lower-level
known as the follower’s problem. The general formulation of BLPP takes the form
(Gu¨mu¨s and Floudas, 2001; Dempe, 2002).
BLPP (1) min
y
F (y, x)
s.t. G(y, x) ≤ 0
H(y, x) = 0
min
x
f(x, y)
s.t. g(x, y) ≤ 0
h(x, y) = 0
x ∈ X ⊂ Rn1, y ∈ Y ⊂ Rn2
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where f, F : Rn1 × Rn2 → R, are the objective functions of the follower and
the leader respectively, g = [g1, ..., gJ ] : R
n1 × Rn2 → RJ , G = [G1, ..., GJ ′ ] :
Rn1 × Rn2 → RJ ′are the inequality constraints of the lower- and the upper-level
problems respectively, and h = [h1, ..., hI ] : R
n1 × Rn2 → RI , H = [H1, ..., HI′ ]
: Rn1 × Rn2 → RI′are the equality constraints of the lower- and the upper-level
problems respectively.
The BLPP’s decision variables are partitioned into two sets of variables y and x
(Dempe, 2002). Anticipating the follower’s reaction, the leader makes the decision
first and selects y that optimizes its objective functions F (y, x). Given the leader
decision, the follower solves an optimization problem parameterized in y to find
x that optimizes its objective functions f(x, y) (Gu¨mu¨s and Floudas, 2001). The
following definitions are related to BLPP (Colson et al., 2007, Gu¨mu¨s and Floudas,
2001).
• The relaxed feasible set of BLPP is defined by the constraints of the lower-
and the upper-level problems,
Ω = {(y, x) : y ∈ Y, x ∈ X,G(y, x) ≤ 0, H(y, x) = 0, g(x, y) ≤ 0, h(x, y) = 0}
• The feasible set of the lower-level problem for a given y¯ ∈ Y is defined as
Ω(y¯) = {x ∈ X, g(x, y¯) ≤ 0, h(x, y¯) = 0}
• Rational reaction set of the lower-level problem for a given y¯ ∈ Y is defined
as
<(y¯) = {x ∈ X : x ∈ arg min{f(xˆ, y¯) : xˆ ∈ Ω(y¯)}}
• inducible region which is the feasible set of BLPP is given by
IR = {(y, x) : (y, x) ∈ Ω, x ∈ <(y)}
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For a given upper-level decision y, the lower level may have multiple optimal
solutions. In this case the reaction set <(y) of the lower-level problem is not a sin-
gleton. Since the leader does not have a control over the follower reactions, it is hard
to estimate its objective function value. Hence, in the literature several approaches
are considered to address this situation. The two most common approaches are:
the optimistic and pessimistic. In the first approach, the leader assumes that the
follower will cooperate with him and select the solution that best suits the leader.
Therefore, if the reaction set <(y) of the lower-level problem is not a singleton, the
leader can choose the course of action in Ω(y) that benefits him most. Conversely,
in the second approach, the leader assumes no cooperation and seeks to minimize
the damage resulting from the follower’s choice (Colson et al., 2007, Dempe, 2002).
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker Conditions
The conventional solution methodologies to BLPP rely on Karush-Kuhn-Tucker
(KKT) optimality conditions. If the lower-level problem is convex and regular,
BLPP can be transformed to a single-level problem by replacing the lower level
problem by KKT optimality conditions (Colson et al., 2007, Gu¨mu¨s and Floudas,
2001). BLPP (1) can be written as the following single level.
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min
y,x,λ,µ
F (y, x)
s.t. G(y, x) ≤ 0
H(y, x) = 0
gi(x, y) ≤ 0 ∀i ∈ I
hj(x, y) = 0 ∀j ∈ J
∇xL(y, x, λ, µ) = 0
λigi(x, y) = 0 ∀i ∈ I
λi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I
Where L(y, x, λ, µ) = f(x, y) +
I∑
i=1
λigi(x, y) +
J∑
j=1
µjhj(x, y). Generally, the
above mathematical program is hard to solve due to the nonconvexities that arise
in the equations that define the stationary and complementarity conditions.
4.1.2 Bilevel Programming Applications
BLPP has diverse and many applications in real-world problems involving sequen-
tial decision-making processes. Some examples are related, but not limited, to the
area of transportation planning, economic, pricing, and GHG mitigation. Below
are some of the works that highlight those applications.
• Transportation: applications of BLPP in the field of transportation appear in
modeling the transportation network design problem and the hazardous ma-
terial network design problem. In the former problem, the interest of decision
makers at the upper level is balancing the cost of investing in increasing some
link capacities against congestion costs, whereas the objective of the network
users is minimizing travel time (Ben-Ayed et al., 1992; Leblanc and Boyce,
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1986; Marcotte, 1986). In the latter problem, policy makers design a network
to be used by hazmat carriers to minimize total risk taking into account the
carrier’s optimal routes choices that minimizes its cost (Erkut and Gzara,
2007; Kara and Verter, 2004; Marcotte et al. 2009).
• Economics: one of BLPP applications in economics arise in modeling a market
with a leader firm and multiple follower firms as a Stackelberg game (Stack-
elberg, 1952). The leader company moves first by choosing its production
quantity taking into account the followers optimal reaction. In contrast, the
followers observe the leader’s decision and choose their production quantities.
Another classical example in economics is the principal-agency problem where
there is a principle who hires an agent to act on his/her behalf (Dempe, 1995).
The principle designs contract parameters that maximize his/her profit and
provide an incentive to the agent who observe the contract parameters and
chooses the efforts that maximizes his/her expected utility functions. Hobbs
and Nelson (1992) modeled the electric utility planning problem as BLPP.
At the upper level, the electric utility controls electric rate and subsidizes
energy conservation programs to minimize costs or maximize benefits while
customers at the lower level maximize their benefits from energy consumption
minus consumption costs.
• Pricing: Lavigne et al. (2000) studied the electricity market and employed a
Stackelberg model to price electricity. Labbe´ et al. (1998) modeled toll-setting
problem as BLPP where the leader seeks to maximize its revenue collected
from setting tolls on some links of a transportation network and the network’s
users minimize their total costs involving tolls and travel cost. Brotcorne et al.
(2008) exploited BLPP to determine prices in airline and telecommunication
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industries and to include decisions related to network designs.
• GHG mitigation: the bilevel models for GHG emission reduction are devoted
to carbon taxes imposed on the total amount of emissions and subsidies.
Kainuma et al. (1999) utilize a bilevel programming model to evaluate the
effects of imposing a combination of a linear carbon tax and subsidies on se-
lecting energy-saving technologies and consequently reducing Japanese GHG
emissions. The government problem is to minimize the total CO2 emissions by
using carbon tax and subsidies, whereas the consumers’ problem is to choose
the optimal combination of energy that minimizes their costs. By trying dif-
ferent tax rates, the results indicate that using a low tax rate without subsidy
is insufficient to reduce CO2 emissions. Zhou et al. (2011) present a bilevel
optimization approach to design effective and efficient incentive policies that
encourage investment in renewable energy. In the lower level problem, a cen-
tral decision maker wants to expand the generation capacity of an energy
system to serve projected demand of electricity with minimum total cost.
The aim of the upper level problem is to encourage the lower-level planner
to invest more in renewable energy by imposing a carbon tax and subsidies.
The results show that combining tax and subsidies is more efficient than us-
ing each policy separately. Bard et al., (2000) presents a bilevel programming
formulation that can be used to help decision makers to design a policy that
encourages petro-chemical industry to produce biofuel from farm crops. In
the model, the objective of the government, the leader, is to minimize the
annual tax credits it allows the petro-chemical industry for producing biofu-
els. In contrast, the objective of the agricultural sector, the follower, is to
maximize profits by selecting the best mix of crops to grow as well as the
percentage of land allocated to non-food crops.
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4.2 Problem Formulation
We formulate the problem of designing a carbon tax policy based on the emission
factor as a bilevel programming problem. We consider a similar situation to the
one presented in Section 3.1 where a regulatory authority is interested in reducing
the production emission factor of a polluting industry by designing an intensity-
based carbon tax policy that reaches the target reduction with the least impact
on the industry. The polluting industry consists of multiple firms each having a
capacity limit and a quadratic production cost. Regulated firms produce a single
homogeneous product and generate CO2 emissions in proportion to their output
levels. CO2 emissions are emitted from burning fossil fuels to produce energy that
is required for production. Regulated companies are required to monitor and report
their production emission factor which is an average value that reflects the level of
CO2 emissions per unit of production. Assuming that the regulatory authority sets
a target emission factor for the industry and taxes firms if they exceed that target,
the regulatory agency is interested in finding the tax rate that induces firms to
reduce their production emission factor. On the contrary, given the carbon tax rate
and assuming a competitive market which its equilibrium model can be formulated
as a social welfare maximization problem (Gabriel et al., 2012, Hazell and Norton,
1986), the regulated industry chooses its output level that maximizes the social
welfare. The hierarchical process of designing a carbon tax scheme leads to a bilevel
formulation. At the upper level, the government determines the tax rate, whereas
at the lower level, the industry, decides on the production level and the fuel types.
Firms can reduce their emission intensities by switching to less carbon-intensive
fuels. The decision of the tax rate made at the upper-level problem affect the social
welfare level, the production quantities, and the choice of fuel type. In contrast,
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the decisions made at the lower-level problem regarding fuel types and production
levels influence the production emission factor.
For the formulation, we use the same notation presented in Section 3.1 and some
additional notation:
Indices i : Index for firms, i ∈ 1, ..., N.
l : Fuel type l ∈ 1, ..., L.
Parameters ci : Variable cost per unit produced at firm i.
ti : Constant associated with the quadratic cost at firm i.
hil : Fuel l cost at firm i.
di : Production capacity at firm i.
bi : Thermal energy consumption at firm i (GJ/tonne).
bˆil : Energy content in fuel l at firm i (GJ/tonne, m
3...).
eil : CO2 emission factor of fuel type l at firm i.
β : A target production emission factor above which
firms pay tax.
γ : Intercept of inverse demand curve.
δ : Slope of inverse demand curve.
Variables qi : Quantity produced at firm i.
qd : Quantity demanded in the market.
wil : Amount of fuel l used at firm i.
xi : Production emission factor for firm i.
E : Production emission factor for the entire industry.
σ0 : Deviation from the target emission factor.
s0 : Deviation from the total emissions.
p : Market price.
α2 : Tax rate.
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4.2.1 Lower-Level Problem
In Section 3.1, we propose the following social welfare maximization model for a
polluting industry that operates under a carbon tax based on the emission factor.
[SW]: max γqd − 12δ(qd)2 −
I∑
i=1
L∑
l=1
(ciqi + tiq
2
i + hilwil)−
I∑
i=1
α2θi (4.1)
s.t. qi ≤ di i = 1, ..., N (4.2)
L∑
l=1
bˆilwil = biqi i = 1, ..., N (4.3)
θi ≥
L∑
l=1
eilwil − βqi i = 1, ..., N (4.4)
qd −
I∑
i=1
qi = 0 (4.5)
qd, qi, wil, θi ≥ 0 i = 1, ..., N, l = 1, ..., L (4.6)
The objective function (4.1) maximizes the sum of consumers’ and producers’
surpluses (in which payments and revenue cancel each other). The first and the
second terms in the objective function correspond to the consumers’ surplus. The
third and the fourth terms in (4.1) denote the production cost which we assume to
be a quadratic; whereas the fifth term represents the fuel cost. The last term in
(4.1) correspond to the emission cost. Constraints (4.2) are the production capacity
limit for each firm. Constraints (4.3) calculate the amount of fossil fuels required by
firm i to produce a quantity qi. Constraints (4.4) calculate the taxed CO2 emissions
for each firm. Constraint (4.5) is the market clearing condition. Constraints (4.6)
are the nonnegativity constraints.
4.2.2 Upper-Level Problem
The regulatory authority problem consists of determining the tax rate that induces
the industry to achieve the target production emission factor.
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max E (4.7)
s.t.
I∑
i=1
L∑
l=1
eilwil = E
I∑
i=1
qi (4.8)
0 ≤ E ≤ β, (4.9)
0 ≤ α2 ≤ αub2 (4.10)
The objective function (4.7) maximizes the resulting emission factor of the in-
dustry to reach the specified target. Constraint (4.8) which is nonlinear, calculates
the resulting emission factor of the industry, whereas constraints (4.9) and (4.10)
are the lower and the upper bounds on the emission factor of the industry and the
tax rate, respectively.
Maximizing the emission factor is equivalent to minimizing the deviation from
the target emission factor:
σ0 = β − E = β −
I∑
i=1
L∑
l=1
eilwil
I∑
i=1
qi
.
With this, the upper level problem is equivalent to:
min σ0
s.t.
I∑
i=1
L∑
l=1
eilwil
I∑
i=1
qi
+ σ0 = β
0 ≤ α2≤ αub2
σ0 ≥ 0
As this problem is nonlinear, we multiply the constraint by
I∑
i=1
qi and instead solve
the linear program:
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min s0
s.t.
I∑
i=1
L∑
l=1
eilwil + s0 = β
I∑
i=1
qi (4.11)
0 ≤ α2≤ αub2
s0 ≥ 0 (4.12)
where s0 is the deviation from the total emissions.
4.2.3 Bilevel Formulation
By combining the upper- and lower-level problems, the bilevel formulation of de-
signing a carbon tax faced by the government agency is:
min s0
s.t.
I∑
i=1
L∑
l=1
eilwil+s0= β
I∑
i=1
qi
0 ≤ α2≤ αub2
max γqd−1
2
δ(qd)2−
I∑
i=1
L∑
l=1
(ciqi+tiq
2
i +hilwil)
−
I∑
i=1
α2θi
s.t. qi≤ di i = 1, ..., N
L∑
l=1
bˆilwil= biqi i = 1, ..., N
−θi+
L∑
l=1
eilwil−βqi≤ 0 i = 1, ..., N
qd−
I∑
i=1
qi= 0
qi, q
d, wil, θi≥ 0 i = 1, ..., N, l = 1, ..., L
s0≥ 0
75
The decision of the tax rate made at the upper-level problem affects the social
welfare level at the lower-level problem, whereas the decisions made at the lower-
level problem regarding the production quantities and the type and the quantities
of the fossil fuels influence the CO2 emission factor.
When the lower level problem is convex in the upper-level decision variables
and satisfies a constraint qualification, the bilevel problem can be transformed to
a single-level problem by replacing the lower-level problem by its Karush-Kuhn-
Tucker (KKT) optimality conditions (Colson et al., 2007, Gu¨mu¨s and Floudas,
2001). Defining ri, λi, ζi, p to be the dual variables associated with constraints
(4.2), (4.3), (4.4), and (4.5) respectively, the KKT optimality conditions of the
lower-level problem are given by
Primal feasibility:
Dual variable
qi≤ di ri≥ 0 i = 1, ..., N
L∑
l=1
bˆilwil−biqi= 0 λi i = 1, ..., N
−θi+
L∑
l=1
eilwil−βqi≤ 0 ζi≥ 0 i = 1, ..., N
qd−
I∑
i=1
qi= 0 p
qi, wil, θi≥ 0 i = 1, ..., N, l = 1, ..., L
Dual feasibility
p− γ + δqd≥ 0 (4.13)
ci+2tiqi+ri−biλi−βζ i−p ≥ 0 i = 1, ..., N (4.14)
bˆilλi+eilζi+hil≥ 0 i = 1, ..., N, l = 1, ..., L (4.15)
α2−ζ i≥ 0 i = 1, ..., N (4.16)
ri, ζ i≥ 0 = 1, ..., N (4.17)
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Associating slack variables s1i , s
2
i , s
3, s4i , s
5
il, s
6
i with constraints (4.2), (4.4), and (4.13)−
(4.17) respectively, the primal and dual feasibility constraints can be rewritten as
qi−di+s1i= 0 i = 1, ..., N (4.18)
−θi+
L∑
l=1
eilwil−βqi+s2i= 0 i = 1, ..., N (4.19)
p− γ + δqd−s3= 0 (4.20)
ci+2tiqi+ri−biλi−βζ i−p− s4i= 0 i = 1, ..., N (4.21)
bˆilλi+eilζi+hil−s5il= 0 i = 1, ..., N, l = 1, ..., L (4.22)
α2−ζ i−s6i= 0 i = 1, ..., N (4.23)
Complementary slackness conditions
s1i ri = 0 i = 1, ..., N (4.24)
s2i ζi = 0 i = 1, ..., N (4.25)
s3qd = 0 (4.26)
s4i qi = 0 i = 1, ..., N (4.27)
s5ilwil = 0 i = 1, ..., N, l = 1, ..., L (4.28)
s6i θi = 0 i = 1, ..., N (4.29)
The bilevel formulation can be transformed to a single-level problem that in-
cludes the optimality conditions of the industry problem into the government prob-
lem.
min s0
s.t. (4.3), (4.5), (4.6), (4.10)− (4.12), and (4.17)− (4.29)
The complementary slackness conditions (4.24) − (4.29) can be linearized by
associating binary variables z1i , z
2
i , z
3, z4i , z
5
il, z
6
i and a large constant M with each
equality constraint (Bard, 1998). The resulting mixed integer program (MIP) is
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[MIP]: min s0
s.t. (4.3), (4.5), (4.6), (4.10)− (4.12),
(4.17)− (4.23), and
s1i ≤Mz1i i = 1, ..., N (4.30)
ri ≤M(1− z1i ) i = 1, ..., N (4.31)
s2i ≤Mz2i i = 1, ..., N (4.32)
ζi ≤M(1− z2i ) i = 1, ..., N (4.33)
s3 ≤Mz3 (4.34)
qd ≤M(1− z3) (4.35)
s4i ≤Mz4i i = 1, ..., N (4.36)
qi ≤M(1− z4i ) i = 1, ..., N (4.37)
s5il ≤Mz5il i = 1, ..., N, l = 1, ..., L (4.38)
wil ≤M(1− z5il) i = 1, ..., N, l = 1, ..., L (4.39)
s6i ≤Mz6i i = 1, ..., N (4.40)
θi ≤M(1− z6i ) i = 1, ..., N (4.41)
z ∈ {0, 1} i = 1, ..., N, l = 1, ..., L (4.42)
4.3 Results and Discussion
To test the proposed model we use the same case study that we have constructed
in Section 3.3. Assuming that the regulating authority aims for a 12.5% reduction
in the production emission factor, we are interested in finding the best tax rate, α2,
that achieves the target reduction in the industry-specific emission factor. The re-
sulting MIP formulation is implemented in MATLAB 7.4 and solved using CPLEX.
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Tables 4.1 and 4.2 display the results of the small case study. The first set of the
results in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 show the solutions of solving [SW] with no carbon tax
or a target emission factor for the industry. The results show that all firms use
petroleum coke to fuel kilns. The high emitter, firm A, produces its full capacity
and generates the highest profit because of its low production cost. However, the
contribution of firm A to the overall emissions is about 45%, whereas its emission
factor is 34% higher than the emission factor of the industry. The second set of the
results in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 present the solutions of the transformed bilevel model,
[MIP]. We found that the best tax rate that achieves the target reduction in the
industry-specific emission factor is $26.49/tC which also reduces the total emissions
by 14.5%. This tax rate reduces the quantity produced by the high emitters by
10% and induces the average and the low emitters to produce their full capacities.
Under this tax rates, the product price increases by 21% leading to 131% increase
in the producers’ surplus. However, the profit of the high emitter has dropped by
37%, whereas the profits of the average and low emitters have increased by 182%
and 300%, respectively, leading to a higher profit for the industry. The solution of
[MIP] demonstrates that firm A uses petroleum coke along with natural gas, firm
B switches to natural gas, and firm C continues using petroleum coke. However,
solving [SW] using the obtained tax rate provides different fuel type for firm A,
which is switching from petroleum coke to natural gas, as presented in the third set
of the results in Table 4.2. Although Tables 4.1 and 4.2 demonstrate that the social
welfare, the quantity produced, the product price, the consumers’ and the produc-
ers’ surpluses obtained from solving [SW] are the same as the ones obtained from
solving [MIP], the emission factor, the total emissions, and the taxed emissions of
firm A are different. This indicates that the lower level problem has multiple solu-
tions for some given tax rates. Specifically, firm A has the option to use petroleum
79
coke along with natural gas and pay more carbon tax or to use natural gas and
pay less carbon tax. Both solutions lead to the same cost and the same profit for
firm A and the same social welfare for the industry. Although it is preferable to
have a lower emission factor and lower overall emissions, the value of the objective
function of the government would be higher if firm A chooses the second solution.
This happened because of our choice of the objective function of the government;
the first solution minimizes the deviations from the total emissions and the target
emission factor, whereas the deviations if firm A chooses the second solution are 79
and 0.009, respectively.
4.3.1 An alternative objective function for the upper-level
problem
When the solutions of the lower-level problem is not uniquely determined for each,
or some, upper-level solutions, the bilevel programming problem is considered to be
unstable. The most common approaches in the literature to overcome the problem
of having multiple solutions are the optimistic and pessimistic (Dempe, 2002). In
this thesis, we assume that the leader takes the optimistic position which assumes
that the follower will choose the best solution for the leader. However, this solution
has a higher emission level which is not preferable. Therefore, we need an alternative
objective function that provides a better value for the objective function of the
leader when the industry selects the solution with the lower emission level. Hence,
we modify (4.7) to the following weighted objective function for the upper-level
problem max τ
I∑
i=1
iqi − νE , where τ, ν ∈ [0, 1] are parameters that indicate the
relative importance of the quantity produced and the emission factor for the decision
makers. We solve the following bilevel program by transforming it to a single level
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mixed integer nonlinear program using KKT conditions as shown previously.
max τ
I∑
i=1
iqi − νE
s.t. (4.8)− (4.10), and (4.1)− (4.6)
[MINLP]: max τ
I∑
i=1
iqi − νE
s.t. (4.3), (4.5), (4.6), (4.8)− (4.10), (4.17)− (4.23), and (4.30)− (4.42)
A Small Case Study
Letting τ = ν = 0.5, we implement [MINLP] in GAMS and solve it using BARON
for different target emission factor. Tables 4.3-4.6 compare the results of [MINLP]
for different target emission factor to the results of solving [SW] given the obtained
tax rate. Table 4.3 presents the tax rates required to achieve different reduction
targets, as well as the percentage changes in the quantity demanded (qd), the emis-
sion factor (EF), the overall emission (TE), the product price (P), the social welfare
(SW), and the consumers’ and the producers surpluses (CS) and (PS). Tables 4.4-
4.6 show the percentage changes in the production quantities, fuel types, emission
factors, total emissions, profits, and costs of each firm for different reduction tar-
gets. The tables demonstrate that using the new objective function provides stable
solutions. Tables 4.3-4.6 and Figure 4.1 illustrate that lowering the target emission
factor and increasing the tax rates decreases the social welfare and drives some or
all firms out of business, e.g., reducing the emission factor by 50% would drive all
firms out of business. The tables and the figure also demonstrate that the tax rates
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increase with lowering the target emission factor then start to drop when the high
and the average emitters are out of business.
Table 4.3 and Figure 4.1 show that in some cases, achieving a reduction in the
emission factors requires a significant increase in the tax rate. For instance, de-
creasing the target emission factor by 27.5% requires increasing the tax rate from
$26.49 to $1095.27 which drives the high emitter, firm A, out of business and de-
creases the production of the average emitter, firm B, by 27.36%. Moreover, this
tax rate decreases the total production, the overall emission, the social welfare, and
the consumer surplus by 42.36%, 58.42%, 38.54%, and 66.77%, respectively, and in-
creases the price and the producer surplus by 345.6% and 1418%, respectively. Note
that although the tax rate is $1095.27, the actual emission costs due to producing
a tonne of cement is given by α2(xi − β). Therefore, the emission costs of firms
A and B are $1095.27(0.94 − 0.6) = $372.39 and $1095.27(0.727 − 0.6) = $139.1,
respectively. Given that a competitive firm maximizes its profit by selecting the
output level at which p = ci+2tiqi+ri−aibiλi+(si−β)ζi , firm A exits the market
and firm B produces 2135 tonne of cement at the current market price for cement
of $182.92. Decision makers need to weight the impact of selecting a target emis-
sion factor and imposing a tax rate to achieve that target. In some cases, different
emission factors can be obtained by the same tax rates; however, the impact on the
social welfare, the total emissions, and other factors are different. For example, if
the decision makers need to choose between reducing the emission factor by 7.5% or
12.5%, we can see that both targets can be achieved by the same tax rate, $26.49.
However, the former decreases the social welfare and the total emissions by 2.21%
and 13.78%, respectively, while the latter decreases them by 2.6% and 15.62%, re-
spectively. Given the small differences in the effects on the social welfare, the later
achieves a higher reduction in the total emissions and therefore provides a better
83
target.
Table 4.3 and Figure 4.1 show that a decrease in the target emission factor
significantly decreases the overall emissions. The reduction is a result of either
switching to less carbon-intensive fuels or reducing production quantities. Tables
4.4-4.6 demonstrate that a tax rate of $26.49 and a target reduction of 12.5%
induce high and average emitters to switch to natural gas to reduce their emissions
factor. On the other hand, decreasing the emission factor by more than 15% and
increasing the tax rates push the high and average emitters to switch from natural
gas to coal and reduce their productions in order to comply with the target and to
reduce their costs. The tables and the figure also show that the producers’ surplus
increases with the increase in the tax rate due to the increase in the market price
while the consumers’ surplus decreases. The producers’ surplus and the market
price reach their maximum when the high and average emitters are out of business
allowing the low emitter to generate the highest profit. The increase in the tax
rates and the reduction in the emission factor significantly reduce the production
quantities and the profit of the high emitter.
Large Case Studies
Table 4.7 shows the impact of different target emission factors using large examples
consisting of 12, 20, and 30 firms. The table presents the target and the achieved re-
duction in the emission factor, the corresponding tax rates, the percentage decrease
or increase in total emissions, productions, market price, social welfare, consumers’
and producers’ surpluses, and the number of firms compared to the no tax case.
The table also shows the CPU time in seconds which increases with the increase in
the number of firms and the target reduction. The results of the large examples are
consistent with the results of the small example. The table illustrates that the tax
84
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rates significantly increase with lowering the target emission factors which lead to
significant reductions in total emissions, productions, social welfare, and consumers’
surplus. The percentage of firms affected by the tax rates and the target reductions
also increases as the tax rates rises and the emission factor decreases putting all
firms out of business as the target reduction reaches 50%. On the other hand, when
the quantities supplied to the market decrease and the market price increases, the
remaining firms, low emitters, generate huge profits. Low emitters benefit from this
policy because they do not pay tax and the high tax rates combined with the low
emission factors keep the high emitters out of the market. The reduction in the
emission factor leads to almost the same reduction in the total emissions for low
targets but as the target reduction increases, the reduction in the total emissions
is almost doubled which is due to the reduction in the productions and switching
fuel types. The table demonstrates that moderate emission targets can be achieved
with moderate tax rates. For instance, target reductions below 20% is achievable
with moderate tax rates and have less impacts on the industry compared to 30%
reduction in the emission factors.
Table 4.8 displays the effects of increasing or decreasing some of the parameters
of the 12-firm example on the tax rates as compared to the taxes obtained in Table
4.7. The table shows that for low target reduction, 10%, ±10% changes in the
production cost or other parameters related to the emission factor of the firms
would not affect the tax rates. For a 20% or more target reductions, the variations
in the parameters related to the emission factors, however, have more impact on
the differences in the tax rates than changes in the production costs. The tax
rates should be higher for 20% or more target reductions if the production cost
turns out to be less than estimated by 10% and should be lower if the production
cost is higher than expected by 10%. On the other hand, ±10% variations in the
90
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parameters related to the emission factors lead to volatility in the tax rates.
Change in the Impact on the tax rates
parameters Target reduction in the em. factor (β)%
10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
Cost ci (−10%) 0 +3.51 +1.23 +1.08 +0.87
Cost ci (+10%) 0 −3.17 −1.23 −1.08 −0.87
Electricity & calcination EF sˆi (−10%) 0 +1.18 +14.50 +13.28 +13.11
Electricity & calcination EF sˆi (+10%) 0 −8.59 −7.24 −4.95 +2.69
Energy consumption bi (−10%) 0 +7.20 −1.51 −2.03 −7.46
Energy consumption bi (+10%) 0 −9.80 −0.11 +0.61 +2.94
Table 4.8: The Impact of Changing Some of the Parameters on the Tax Rates (12 Firms)
4.4 Conclusion
This chapter presents a bilevel formulation to design a carbon tax policy based on
the emission factor. At the upper level, the government sets a target level for the
emission factor of the industry and tax firms if they exceed that target. Assuming
a competitive market, at the lower level, the industry decides on the production
quantity and the fuel types that maximize the social welfare given the tax rate
and the market price. Therefore, the problem of the regulatory authorities is to
find the best tax rate that achieves a specific target. We propose two objective
functions for the government: one is to minimize the deviation from the target
reduction and the other is to maximize the weighted difference between production
and emission factor. We transform the bilevel model into a single-level MINLP by
replacing the lower-level problem by its KKT optimality conditions and linearizing
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complementary slackness. We test the transformed model on several examples
constructed in the context of the cement industry.
The results indicate that the proposed model finds the optimal tax rate that
induces firms to reduce their emission factors and consequently reduces the overall
emissions. Higher reduction in the emission factors significantly increases the tax
rates, decreases the social welfare and production quantities, and may put some
firms out of business. On the other hand, adequate reduction in the emission fac-
tors, below 20%, is achievable with moderate tax rates that have a little impact on
the industry and lead to a large reduction in the overall emissions. Although, the
optimal tax rate reduces the quantity supplied by the high emitters and increases
the quantity supplied by the low and average emitters, the overall quantities de-
crease leading to a higher market price and higher profits for the low and average
emitters.
In this chapter, the effectiveness of the intensity-based carbon tax in reducing
the emission of a polluting industrial sector is tested in the context of the cement
industry. The policy is found to reduce the CO2 emissions with a little impact on
the social welfare. To examine the effectiveness of the policy on reducing the CO2
emissions of a different polluting industry, the next chapter tests the policy in the
context of supply chain design to find the tax rate that induces firms to reduce
their transport-related CO2 emissions.
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Chapter 5
Green Supply Chain Redesign
through an Intensity-Based Tax
Policy
In this chapter, we examine the effectiveness of the intensity-based carbon tax on
reducing CO2 emissions from a major supply chain activity, namely transportation.
Specifically, we model a situation where policy makers set a target emission factor
for transportation and tax companies if they exceed that level. We assume that
firms can reduce their emission factors by changing the design of their supply chain
networks, reducing shipment frequency, and using electric trucks. We model the
problem as a bilevel program where at the upper level the government decides on
the tax rate and at the lower level firms decide on the design of their supply chain
and truck types. However, due to the difficulty of the bilevel problem as it has
nonlinearities in the upper-level problem as well as binary and integer variables in
the lower-level problem, we find the tax rate by solving the lower-level problem for
different tax rates and picking the lowest one that achieves the target reduction.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.1 reviews some related literature
Section 5.2 details the problem formulation. Section 5.3 gives a case study used to
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carry out the analysis. Section 5.4 presents the results and Section 5.5 concludes
the chapter.
5.1 Background
Traditionally, companies employ two performance measures to evaluate the effec-
tiveness and efficiency of their supply chains (SC): cost and service level. However,
environmental regulations and increasing customer awareness of environmental is-
sues such as global warming, pressure companies to include sustainability in their
performance measures (Labuschagne and Brent, 2005, Matthews et al., 2008). As
a result, new concepts such as sustainable and green supply chain management
(GrSCM) have recently emerged (Srivastara, 2007). Seuring and Muler (2008) de-
fine sustainable supply chain management as:
the management of material, information and capital flows as well as
cooperation among companies along the supply chain while taking goals
from all three dimensions of sustainable development, i.e., economic,
environmental and social, into account which are derived from customer
and stakeholder requirements.
Many organizations are realizing the necessity of moving toward sustainabil-
ity and are starting to take actions towards monitoring and reducing their carbon
footprints. For instance, Wal-Mart engaged in an environmental plan to reduce
energy use, waste, and greenhouse gas emissions by 20% by 2012. Dell changed its
transportation mode from air to ground in its green campaign. IBM established
its environmental management system and shows strong commitments through its
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pollution prevention program (Kumar, 2007). Despite the voluntary steps that
have been taken by some companies to reduce the levels of their CO2 emissions,
the achieved reduction is insufficient to combat climate change. Plambeck (2012)
discusses some examples that illustrates how firms can profitably reduce their emis-
sions and concludes that without environmental policies these efforts cannot address
the threat of climate change. Chen et al. (2011) show that significant reductions in
emissions can be achieved by imposing a low tax rate. On the other hand, Hoen et
al. (2011a) find that while imposing a low tax rate induces some firms to shift to
more energy-efficient transport modes, other firms require a high tax rate to reduce
their emissions. Plambeck and Taylor (2013) argue that under a cap-and-trade
system, volatility in the price of carbon credits reduces the incentive to improve
energy efficiency and in order to promote investment in clean technologies a high
tax rate must be imposed.
Designing effective environmental policies that reduce the negative impacts of
industries on the environment and help organizations achieve sustainability cannot
be undertaken in isolation from the strategic and operational decisions of the regu-
lated entities. However, in light of the reviewed literature, the work that explicitly
addresses the issue of climate change within the context of green supply chain man-
agement focuses on quantifying the carbon footprint of supply chains, analysing the
practices that can be used to reduce emissions, and evaluating the performance of
supply chains under environmental policies or voluntarily targets with no attention
paid to the policy design. Lee (2011) examines the integration of carbon footprint
in automobile supply chain management using Hyundai Motor Company as an ex-
ample. The analysis reveals that identifying and measuring direct and indirect
carbon emissions across the supply chain can help companies in setting a target
for improving the carbon footprint per unit produced. Sundarakani et al. (2010)
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propose an analytical model to quantify the carbon footprint across supply chains.
Particularly, the proposed model calculates the GHG emissions from raw mate-
rial, manufacturing, warehousing, and inbound and outbound logistics. Kannan et
al. (2009) propose a closed loop supply chain model that integrates the forward
and reverse logistics in a built-to-order supply chain. The model is tested on two
case studies and solved using genetic algorithm. Caniato et al. (2012) compare
two groups of companies: established international brands and small companies to
investigate the factors driving fashion companies to adopt sustainable practices,
the practices that can be used to improve environmental sustainability, and the
resulting performance measures. The analysis shows that large companies focus
on products and process improvement whereas small companies focus on reshaping
their supply chains. Benjaafar et al. (2010) use a lot-sizing model to examine the
impact of operational decisions on carbon emissions and show that a significant
reduction can be achieved by making adjustments in the order quantities. Chen et
al. (2011) exploit the economic order quantity model to show that carbon emis-
sions can be reduced by some operational adjustments if the operational decisions
that reduce emissions are different from the operational decisions that reduce cost.
Nagurney and Yu (2012) propose an oligopoly model for fashion supply chain com-
petition to capture brand differentiation and environmental consciousness. Each
firm is assumed to have a weighted objective function that maximizes its profit and
minimizes its emissions. Variational inequality theory is exploited to formulate the
problem and solve several examples. The results demonstrate the effects of chang-
ing the cost and the emission functions as well as the weights associated with the
emissions on the demand, the product price, and the profit. Cruz and Matsypura
(2009) develop a framework to model a supply chain network that is environmen-
tally conscious. The model considers the multicriteria decision-making behaviour
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of manufacturers, retailers, and consumers, which includes: the maximization of
profit and the minimization of emissions and risk.
Hua et al. (2011) propose an environmental inventory model that integrates
carbon footprints into the classic economic order quantity (EOQ) under a cap-and-
trade policy. The impact of the carbon price and carbon cap on order decisions and
total costs are examined. Choi (2013) examine how a carbon tax affects the optimal
choice of sourcing decisions under tow types of contracts in the context of fashion
supply chain. A carbon tax that only imposed on outsourced products can induce
retailers to source locally. Hoen et al. (2011) use a profit-maximization model
to study the effect of switching transport modes on meeting a voluntary target
reduction and find that a reduction in the emissions can be achieved by switching
from road transport to rail transport. Ramudhin et al. (2008) employ a multi-
objective mixed-integer linear programming model to integrate the price of carbon
credits into the design of supply chain. To reduce the emissions of production
and transportation activities, firms may switch to a slower transport mode, change
suppliers, or by carbon credits. Gemechu et al. (2012) examine a carbon tax
imposed on products based on their carbon footprint which is calculated using the
methods of life cycle analysis (LCA) and environmentally extended input–output
analysis (EIO). A case study of the pulp and paper sector in Spain is used to carry
out the analyses. The work of Gemechu et al. (2012) is similar to our work in that
it targets the emission intensity of products; however, our work differs in several
aspects. First, our work focuses on integrating the decisions of regulated intensities
into the design of the intensity-based carbon tax to find the best tax rate that
achieves a target reduction, whereas environmental tax in Gemechu et al. (2012) is
set to be equal to the price of carbon permits in the European Union’s Emissions
Trading Scheme. Second, our work studies a carbon tax scheme that requires
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companies to pay tax only if their emission intensities exceed a target level; on the
contrary, environmental tax in Gemechu et al. (2012) is imposed on all the emissions
of the product. Third, we study a carbon tax scheme that targets the CO2 emission
factor of an energy intensive activity. On the other hand, Gemechu et al. (2012)
calculate all the direct and indirect GHG emissions of a product. Gemechu et al.
(2012) demonstrate that this calculation is time consuming and labor intensive and
because it involves covering every aspect of the supply chain, it is highly subject
to error. The results of the case study show that the production related energy
has the highest impact on the life cycle of the product. Moreover, CO2 emissions,
mostly energy related, account for 90% of the calculated GHG emissions.
5.2 Problem Formulation
We consider a situation where decision makers impose a carbon tax to reduce
the transportation emission factor (denoted by E) due to multiple supply chains.
Specifically, policy makers set a target emission factor ( β) per product transported
and tax companies if they exceed that limit. Assuming that the regulatory author-
ity options are limited to influencing firms’ decisions, policy makers are interested
in finding the tax rate, α2, that achieves the target reduction. The industry is
assumed to consist of N companies with independent supply chains that ship a ho-
mogeneous product. Each company i = 1, ..., N owns a supply chain network that
consists of existing suppliers, where shipping points are denoted by m ∈ {1, ...,M i},
potential geographical sites j ∈ {1, ..., Ji} for locating distribution centers (DCs),
and customer zones k ∈ {1, ..., Ki} at fixed locations (Figure 5.1). Each DC has a
capacity limit of sij and incurs an annual fixed cost of fij. Firm i can use domestic
suppliers and/or offshore suppliers which have lower production costs. The shipping
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points of local suppliers are assumed to be their plants, whereas the shipping points
of offshore suppliers are assumed to be the container terminal at the port of entry.
Products purchased from offshore suppliers are transported to the destination port
through vessels then shipped to DCs using trucks. Shipping points and customer
zones are connected to DCs by different types of trucks denoted by l ∈ {1, ..., Li}.
Trucks which are powered by diesel, gasoline, and electricity are assumed to be
available at DC j to operate on long- and short-distance routes. However, electric
trucks can only operate on short distance routes (less than 60 km due to battery
life). Trucks are assumed to be owned or rented by each supply chain and a per-
centage of the truck cost is assumed to be allocated to each shipment as fixed costs
denoted by timjl and tˆijkl (the former is the fixed cost of the shipment from the
shipping point m ∈ Mi to DC j ∈ Ji using truck l ∈ Li and the later is the fixed
cost of a shipment from DC j ∈ Ji to customer zone k ∈ Ki using truck l ∈ Li). The
number of shipments vimjl between shipping point m ∈ Mi and DC j ∈ Ji using
truck l ∈ Li is calculated as sˆilvimjl = qimjl, where sˆil and qimjl represent the truck
capacity and the quantity shipped from shipping point m ∈Mi to DC j ∈ Ji using
truck l ∈ Li, respectively. Similarly, the number of shipments vˆijkl between DC j
∈ Ji and customer zone k ∈ Ki using truck l ∈ Li is calculated as sˆilvˆijkl = qˆijkl,
where qˆijkl represent the quantity shipped from DC j ∈ Ji to customer zone k ∈ Ki
using truck l ∈ Li. Customer demand, dik, over a given long-term period is assumed
to be known.
The transport-related CO2 emissions of the product shipped from shipping point
m ∈ Mi consists of two parts. The first one is the CO2 emissions generated by
the transportation mode that is used to deliver the product to the shipping point
m ∈ Mi which is calculated as eˆim
∑
j∈Ji
∑
l∈Li
qimjl, where eˆim is the emission factor
of the transportation mode (note that this emission factor is zero for domestic
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Supplier m DC j Customer k 
Figure 5.1: A three-echelon green supply chain network of firm i
suppliers since the product is shipped directly from plants to DCs, whereas for
offshore suppliers this emission factor is the one of the vessels used). The second
one is the CO2 emissions generated by trucks that are used to deliver the product
to DCs. Given that companies are responsible for their own transportation, they
bear the fuel cost and the emissions of the return trips. The total fuel or electricity,
wimjl, required by truck l ∈ Li to deliver shipments between shipping point m ∈Mi
and DC j ∈ Ji is represented by wimjl= (bil + bˆil)aimjvimjl where bil and bˆil are
the fuel or electricity consumption (Liter, MWh/km) for a loaded and an empty
truck, respectively, and aimj is the distance from shipping point m ∈ Mi to DC j
∈ Ji. The transport-related CO2 emissions of the product shipped from DCs is the
emissions generated by trucks used. The total fuel or electricity, wˆijkl, required by
truck l ∈ Li to deliver shipments between DC j ∈ Ji and customer zone k ∈ Ki is
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represented by wˆijkl= (bil + bˆil)aˆijkvˆijkl where aˆijk is the distance from DC j ∈ Ji
to customer zone k ∈ Ki. Regulated companies are required to monitor and report
their emission factor, xi, which is an average value that reflects the level of CO2
emissions per unit shipped.
Knowing the emission factors of the transportation mode and the emission fac-
tors eil (kg/Liter, MWh) for the electricity or the fuels used for truck l ∈ Li will
assist companies in calculating their total emissions
TEi =
∑
m∈Mi
∑
j∈Ji
∑
l∈Li
eilwimjl +
∑
j∈Ji
∑
k∈Ki
∑
l∈Li
eilwˆijkl + eˆim
∑
m∈Mi
∑
j∈Ji
∑
l∈Li
qimjl
and consequently their emission factors as
xi =
TEi∑
j∈Ji
∑
k∈Ki
∑
l∈Li
qˆ
ijkl
Assuming that regulatory authorities freely allocate each company certain num-
ber of carbon credits, β
∑
j∈Ji
∑
k∈Ki
∑
l∈Li
qˆijkl, firms are required to pay tax only if their
emission factors exceed the target level β. Therefore, the CO2 emission cost of firm
i is given by
g(xi) =

0 for 0 ≤ xi ≤ β
α2
∑
j∈Ji
∑
k∈Ki
∑
l∈Li
qˆijkl(xi − β) for xi > β.
(5.1)
Defining cimjl to be the production and shipping cost per unit shipped from
shipping point m ∈ Mi to DC j ∈ Ji using truck l ∈ Li, cˆijkl to be the average
handling cost per unit shipped from DC j ∈ Ji to customer zone k ∈ Ki using
truck l ∈ Li, hil to be the fuel or electricity cost ($/Liter, MWh, ..), and yij to be a
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binary variable that equals 1 if DC j ∈ Ji is opened and 0 otherwise, the objective
function of each supply chain is to minimize the total fixed and the variable costs.
Transport-related CO2 emissions can be reduced by strategic changes in network
design, using electric trucks, and reducing shipment frequency. The hierarchical
process of the problem leads to a bilevel formulation where at the upper level, the
government determines the tax rate, and at the lower level, companies seek to find
the optimal network configuration and the optimal type of trucks that have the
minimum total costs.
The bilevel formulation of designing a carbon tax faced by the decision makers
is:
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min E (5.2)
s.t.
N∑
i=1
TEi= E
N∑
i=1
∑
j∈Ji
∑
k∈Ki
∑
l∈Li
qˆijkl (5.3)
0 ≤ E ≤ β, (5.4)
0 ≤ α2≤ αub2 (5.5)
min
N∑
i=1
∑
m∈Mi
∑
j∈Ji
∑
k∈Ki
∑
l∈Li
(f ijyij+timjlvimjl
+tˆijklvˆijkl+cimjlqimjl+cˆijklqˆijkl+hilwimjl
+hilwˆijkl)+
N∑
i=1
g(xi) (5.6)
s.t.
∑
j∈Ji
∑
l∈Li
qˆijkl≥ dik ∀i, k ∈ Ki (5.7)∑
m∈Mi
∑
l∈Li
qimjl=
∑
k∈Ki
∑
l∈Li
qˆijkl ∀i, j ∈ J i, (5.8)
wimjl= (bil+bˆil)aimjvimjl ∀i,m ∈M i, j ∈ J i, l ∈ Li (5.9)
wˆijkl= (bil+bˆil)aˆijkvˆijkl ∀i, j ∈ J i, k ∈ Ki, l ∈ Li (5.10)
TEi=
∑
m∈Mi
∑
j∈Ji
∑
l∈Li
(eˆimqimjl+eilwimjl)
+
∑
j∈Ji
∑
k∈Ki
∑
l∈L
eilwˆijkl i = 1, ..., N (5.11)
xi
∑
j∈Ji
∑
k∈Ki
∑
l∈Li
qˆijkl= TEi i = 1, ..., N (5.12)
sˆilvimjl= qimjl ∀i,m ∈M i, j ∈ J i, l ∈ Li (5.13)
sˆilvˆijkl= qˆijkl ∀i, j ∈ J i, k ∈ Ki, l ∈ Li (5.14)∑
m∈Mi
∑
l∈Li
qimjl≤ sijyij ∀i, j ∈ J i (5.15)∑
m∈Mi
∑
l∈Li
sˆilvimjl≤ sijyij ∀i, j ∈ J i (5.16)∑
k∈Ki
∑
l∈Li
sˆilvˆijkl≤ sijyij ∀i, j ∈ J i (5.17)
qimjl, qˆijkl, wimjl, wˆijkl, xi, TEi≥ 0 ∀i, j ∈ J i, k ∈ Ki, l ∈ Li (5.18)
yij ∈ {0, 1} , vimjl, vˆijkl ≥ 0 and integer ∀i, j ∈ J i, k ∈ Ki, l ∈ Li (5.19)
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(5.2)−(5.5) correspond to the upper-level problem. The objective function of the
regulatory authority (5.2) minimizes the emission factor of transporting products.
Constraint (5.3) which is nonlinear calculates the emission factor of transportation
for the entire industry. Constraints (5.4) and (5.5) are the lower and the upper
bounds on the emission factor for the industry and the tax rate, respectively. (5.6)−
(5.19) represent the lower-level problem. The objective function of the lower-level
problem (5.6) minimizes the total fixed and the variable costs of all supply chains.
The first, the second, and the third terms in the objective function represent the
fixed costs of opening DCs and using trucks. The fourth term is the production
and transportation costs of products shipped from suppliers to DCs, whereas the
fifth term is the shipping and handling costs of products shipped from DCs to
customers. The sixth and the seventh terms in the objective functions are the fuel
or energy costs. The last term in the objective function is the CO2 emission cost.
Constraints (5.7) ensure that the demand is satisfied. Constraints (5.8) are product
flow conservation constraints at DCs. Constraints (5.9) and (5.10) calculate the
fuel or the electricity used by each truck for each shipment. Constraints (5.11) and
(5.12) calculate the total emissions and the emission factor of transportation for
each supply chain, respectively. Constraints (5.13) and (5.14) calculate the number
of shipment between shipping points and DCs and between DCs and customer
zones using a specific truck. Constraints (5.15), (5.16), and (5.17) force capacity
restrictions on the opened DCs and ensure that only opened DCs are used.
From (5.1) and (5.12), the taxed CO2 emission level can be represented by the
maximum of
(TEi − β
∑
j∈Ji
∑
k∈Ki
∑
l∈Li
qˆijkl, 0).
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Defining θi= max (TEi − β
∑
j∈Ji
∑
k∈Ki
∑
l∈Li
qˆijkl, 0), the CO2 emission cost of firm i can
be represented as α2θi. Hence, the objective function of the industry (5.6) can be
rewritten as:
min
N∑
i=1
∑
m∈Mi
∑
j∈Ji
∑
k∈Ki
∑
l∈Li
(fijyij + timjlvimjl+ tˆijklvˆijkl+ cimjlqimjl+ cˆijklqˆijkl+hilwimjl
+hilwˆijkl) +
N∑
i=1
α2θi,
and constraints (5.12) can be replaced by the following constraints
θi ≥ TEi − β
∑
j∈Ji
∑
k∈Ki
∑
l∈Li
qˆijkl, i = 1, ..., N.
5.3 Case Study
We construct a case study consisting of two firms, Firm1 and Firm2; each owns a
supply chain that has two known suppliers, three candidate locations for DCs, and
two retailers at fixed locations. The high-cost domestic suppliers, which are supplier
2 of each firm, are located in Canada, whereas the offshore suppliers are located in
China. Container barge with emission factor of 19.6 g CO2/tonne-km are assumed
to be used to ship the product to Canada (CEEIC-ECTA, 2011). The distance cal-
culator on the website of sea rates is used to calculate the distance between supply
ports and destination ports. The product is measured by its shipping package which
we assume its weight is 30 lb and its dimensions are 1.04 × 0.73 × 0.647 m. The
weight of the product as well as the distance and the emission factor of the vessels
used are employed to calculate the emission factor eim of each firm which are found
to be 5.79 kg/ product and 5.87 kg/ product for Firm 1 and Firm 2, respectively.
The distance between DCs and retailers are given in Table 5.1. Table 5.2 presents
DCs capacities and fixed costs as well as demand at retailers. We assume that
each supply chain owns four types of trucks: class-5 gasoline, class-7 diesel, class-8
106
diesel, and class-5 electric trucks. Class-8 diesel trucks are available only for routes
longer than 80 km and between container terminal and DCs while electric trucks
can be used only for routes less than 60 km. The weight of the product and the
dimensions are used to calculate truck capacities in terms of the product. Table 5.3
shows the capacity, the dimensions, and the costs of trucks, the costs of fuels and
electricity, the fuel and electricity consumption of loaded and empty trucks, and
the CO2 emission factors of fuels and electricity (Cooper et al., 2009, Environment
Canada (Electricity Intensity Tables, Fuel Combustion), IESO, Logistics Solution
Builders, 2006, MIT, Tunnell & Brewster, 2005, U.S. Department of Energy, 2012,
VTT, 2006). We also assume that the fixed cost of each shipment is 1.19% of the
truck cost.
DCs Shipping points Retailers
Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 1 Firm 2
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
1 55 200 41 59 280 500 245 419
2 220 400 439 456 42 790 57 585
3 560 320 260 390 800 35 900 55
Table 5.1: Distance between shipping points and DCs and between retailers and
DCs
Firms DC capacity ×(103) DC cost ×(103) Retailer demand
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2
1 20 20 20 250 250 250 8000 10000
2 20 20 20 250 250 250 8000 10000
Table 5.2: Capacity and costs of DCs and demand at retailers
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5.4 Results and Discussion
We construct several examples based on the case study. In the first example, we use
the data presented in Tables 5.1-5.3. Assuming that the regulatory authority aims
for 15% reduction in the transportation emission factor, we are interested in finding
the best tax rate α2 that achieves the target reduction. Because of the difficulty
of the bilevel problem as it has nonlinearities in the upper-level problem as well
as binary and integer variables in the lower-level problem, we use an alternative
approach to find the tax rate that achieves the target reduction in the emission
factor. We fix the value of α2 in the lower-level problem, solve the resulting mixed
integer program (MIP) for several values of α2, and pick the lowest α2 that achieves
the target emission factor. The resulting MIP is implemented in GAMS 23.3 and
solved using COINCPLEX. Table 5.4 presents the results of solving the lower-level
problem with no carbon tax. The results show that each firm opens one distribution
center to serve its customers and uses offshore suppliers. The results also show that
Firm 1 doesn’t use electric trucks whereas Firm 2 uses electric trucks in 2.3% of its
shipments.
Emission Total Total Opened Used Use of electric
factor emission cost DCs suppliers Trucks%
Firm1 7.850 142134 3530695 DC11 Sup1 0
Firm2 7.617 140630 3622614 DC21 Sup1 2.3
Industry 7.733 282764 7153309 DC11,DC21 Sup1 1.25
Table 5.4: Results with no carbon tax
Table 5.5 shows the percentage reduction in the emission factor and total emis-
sions, the percentage change in total costs, opened DCs, used suppliers, and the
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percentage use of electric trucks for different tax rates. From the table, we can see
that tax rates ranging between $10/kg CO2 and $70/kg CO2 do not induce firms to
reduce their emission factors to the target level. A tax rate of $77/kg CO2 induces
Firm 1 and Firm 2 to reduce their emissions factors by 16.71% and 13.93%, re-
spectively, which results in 15.34% reduction in the emission factor of the industry.
The table also demonstrates that achieving the target reduction reduces the total
emissions by 15.98% and increases the total cost by 36.82%. The table reveals that
firms comply by increasing the use of electric trucks, opening additional DCs, and
using domestic and offshore suppliers. These results also presented in Figure 5.2,
which shows the network design of each firm with no carbon tax and with the ef-
fective tax rate $77. With no carbon tax both firms open one DC and use offshore
suppliers. With a tax rate of $77 firms open two DCs and use the domestic and
offshore suppliers. Table 5.5 illustrates that with tax rates ranging between $10/kg
CO2 and $40/kg CO2 Firm 2 reduces its emission factor by increasing the use of
electric trucks. With a tax rate of $50, in addition to increasing the use of electric
trucks Firm 2 reduces its emission factor by opening another DC. The table shows
that tax rates ranging between $10 and $50 do not induce Firm 1 to use electric
trucks whereas a tax rate of $60 does. Tax rates beyond $77 do not have impact
on the firms’ decisions, emissions, and costs since firms’ emission factors are below
the target.
We compare the carbon tax policy based on the emission factor to the tax policy
targeting total emissions. In order to modify the lower-level problem to operate
under a tax on total emissions, we set β = 0. We solve the previous example for
different tax rates and present the percentage reduction in the emission factor and
total emissions, the percentage change in total costs, opened DCs, used suppliers,
and the percentage use of electric trucks in Table 5.6. Table 5.6 shows that with
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Figure 5.2: Network design with and without carbon tax
tax rates ranging between $10 and $60 the reduction in the emission factors and the
total emissions are not significant although there is a significant increase in the total
costs. Firm 2 increases the use of electric trucks, opens additional DC and uses both
suppliers with tax rates higher than $50. Firm 1 uses electric trucks under tax rates
higher than $50 and changes its network design under tax rates higher than $60.
A tax rate of $70 is found to reduce the emission factor and the total emissions by
further 8.38% and 8.01%, respectively, compared to the results of the effective tax
rate of $77 under carbon tax based on the emission factor; however, it increases the
total cost by 237.49%. The table demonstrates that as the tax rates increase, firms
switch to domestic suppliers, the reduction in the total emissions and the emission
112
factor increases, and the total cost significantly increases. Figure 5.3 presents the
reduction in the emission factors and total emissions and the increase in the total
cost for different tax rates under both policies that impose a tax on the emission
factor and total emissions. The figures indicate that for tax rates ranging between
$10 and $60 the differences in the emission factors and total emissions are not
significant; however, the tax policy based on the emission factor has a significantly
lower cost.
To see the impact of the costs and the capacity of electric trucks on firms’ deci-
sions, we construct Examples 2− 11 which have the same data presented in Tables
5.1-5.3 except that we decrease the fixed cost of the electric trucks in Examples
2 − 6 by 10% each time and increase the capacity of electric trucks in Examples
7− 11 by 10% each time. Table 5.7 compares the results of Examples 2− 11 to the
ones obtained under the tax policy based on the emission factor using a tax rate of
$77. Table 5.7 indicates that as the fixed cost of the electric trucks decrease, the
tax rates required to achieve the target reduction increase. Decreasing the fixed
costs of electric trucks assists firms in achieving lower CO2 emissions and emission
factors at lower costs. Firm 2 maintains the same network design obtained under a
tax rate of $77 but increases the use of electric trucks. Firm 1 changes the design
of its supply chain and opens DC 1 instead of DC 2 to benefit from using electric
trucks between supplier 1 and DC 1. Increasing the capacity of the electric trucks
by 10% has no impact on the tax rate although the achieved CO2 emissions and
emission factors are lower. On the other hand, increasing the capacity of the elec-
tric trucks by 20%− 50% increases the tax rates; however, the tax rates are lower
than the ones required in Examples 2 − 6. Although firms are able to lower their
CO2 emissions and emission factors at lower costs in Examples 7− 11 compared to
the results of using a tax rate of $77, the obtained results are higher than the ones
113
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achieved from decreasing the cost of electric trucks. Firm 2 does not change the
design of its supply chain but decreases the percentage use of electric trucks due to
increasing their capacities. Increasing the capacity of electric trucks beyond 10%
induces Firm 1 to increases the use of electric trucks and change the design of its
supply chain when the capacity is increased by 50%.
To examine the impact of the fuel costs and the fuel consumption of heavy-duty
trucks on firms’ decisions, we construct Examples 12 − 21 which have the same
data presented in Tables 5.1-5.3 except that we increase the fuel cost in Examples
12− 16 by 5% each time and decrease the fuel consumption of class-8-diesel truck
in Examples 17− 21 by 5% each time. Table 5.8 compares the results of Examples
12−21 to the ones obtained under the tax policy based on the emission factor using
a tax rate of $77. The table shows that increasing fuel costs decrease the tax rate
required to achieve the target reduction and increases the total costs. Firms keep
the design of their supply chains but increase the percentage use of electric trucks.
Although increasing fuel costs decreases the tax rate, the achieved reduction in the
CO2 emissions and the emission factors are higher. Improving the fuel consumption
of class-8-diesel truck increases the tax rates; however, this increase is lower than the
one obtained from decreasing the fixed costs of electric trucks. Decreasing the fuel
consumption of class-8-diesel truck helps firms in achieving lower CO2 emissions
and emission factors at lower costs. The table illustrates that firms reduce the
percentage use of electric trucks as the fuel consumption improve until they use no
electric trucks. When the fuel consumption is improved beyond 15%, Firm 1 closes
one of its DCs and utilizes class-8-diesel truck, whereas Firm 2 closes its second DCs
when the fuel consumption is improved by 30%. Comparing the impacts of fuel cost
and fuel consumption, Table 5.8 demonstrates that changing both parameters leads
to almost the same reduction in the CO2 emissions and emission factors; however,
116
C
h
a
n
g
e
in
C
h
a
n
g
e
in
th
e
re
su
lt
s
th
e
p
a
ra
m
et
er
s
T
a
x
E
m
is
si
o
n
fa
ct
o
r%
T
o
ta
l
em
is
si
o
n
s%
T
o
ta
l
co
st
%
O
p
en
ed
D
C
s
U
se
d
su
p
p
li
er
s
U
se
o
f
E
.
T
ru
ck
s%
E
-t
ru
ck
co
st
ra
te
%
In
d
u
s.
F
ir
m
1
F
ir
m
2
In
d
u
s.
F
ir
m
1
F
ir
m
2
In
d
u
s.
F
ir
m
1
F
ir
m
2
F
ir
m
1
F
ir
m
2
F
ir
m
1
F
ir
m
2
F
ir
m
1
F
ir
m
2
E
X
.2
(−
1
0
%
)
6
.4
9
−0
.1
3
−0
.1
2
−0
.0
9
−0
.1
5
−0
.1
9
−0
.1
3
−0
.2
7
−0
.3
7
−0
.1
5
D
C
1
1
,D
C
1
3
D
C
2
1
,D
C
2
3
S
u
p
1
,S
u
p
2
S
u
p
1
,S
u
p
2
3
7
.9
1
.3
E
X
.3
(−
2
0
%
)
1
8
.1
8
−0
.2
5
−0
.2
2
−0
.1
0
−0
.2
9
−0
.3
2
−0
.2
7
−0
.4
6
−0
.5
1
−0
.2
8
D
C
1
1
,D
C
1
3
D
C
2
1
,D
C
2
3
S
u
p
1
,S
u
p
2
S
u
p
1
,S
u
p
2
3
8
.2
4
.7
E
X
.4
(−
3
0
%
)
2
2
.0
8
−0
.4
9
−0
.6
0
−0
.2
3
−0
.6
6
−0
.9
3
−0
.7
9
−0
.9
8
−1
.2
0
−1
.0
8
D
C
1
1
,D
C
1
3
D
C
2
1
,D
C
2
3
S
u
p
1
,S
u
p
2
S
u
p
1
,S
u
p
2
4
3
.3
6
.1
E
X
.5
(−
4
0
%
)
2
5
.9
7
−0
.5
1
−0
.6
1
−0
.2
5
−0
.7
0
−0
.9
4
−0
.8
0
−2
.5
0
−2
.9
0
−1
.2
7
D
C
1
1
,D
C
1
3
D
C
2
1
,D
C
2
3
S
u
p
1
,S
u
p
2
S
u
p
1
,S
u
p
2
4
4
.5
8
7
.0
E
X
.6
(−
5
0
%
)
2
9
.8
7
−0
.9
5
−1
.0
1
−0
.5
8
−1
.3
6
−1
.1
9
−1
.6
5
−3
.0
1
−3
.8
6
−2
.6
3
D
C
1
1
,D
C
1
3
D
C
2
1
,D
C
2
3
S
u
p
1
,S
u
p
2
S
u
p
1
,S
u
p
2
5
3
.7
5
1
0
.6
0
E
-t
ru
ck
ca
p
a
c.
E
X
.7
(+
1
0
%
)
0
.0
0
−0
.1
7
−0
.3
4
−0
.1
1
−0
.2
1
−0
.3
5
−0
.1
6
−0
.1
3
−0
.3
3
−0
.0
8
D
C
1
2
,D
C
1
3
D
C
2
1
,D
C
2
3
S
u
p
1
,S
u
p
2
S
u
p
1
,S
u
p
2
−2
.7
−3
.8
1
E
X
.8
(+
2
0
%
)
2
.6
0
−0
.0
8
−0
.0
2
−0
.1
4
−0
.2
4
−0
.0
3
−0
.4
5
−0
.7
5
−0
.4
7
−1
.0
6
D
C
1
2
,D
C
1
3
D
C
2
1
,D
C
2
3
S
u
p
1
,S
u
p
2
S
u
p
1
,S
u
p
2
2
9
.9
6
−5
.6
9
E
X
.9
(+
3
0
%
)
7
.7
9
−0
.0
5
−0
.1
6
−0
.0
7
−0
.7
3
−1
.4
1
−0
.1
4
−0
.8
4
−0
.1
1
−1
.6
9
D
C
1
2
,D
C
1
3
D
C
2
1
,D
C
2
3
S
u
p
1
,S
u
p
2
S
u
p
1
,S
u
p
2
3
3
.6
2
−9
.8
0
E
X
.1
0
(+
4
0
%
)
1
1
.6
9
−0
.1
9
−0
.3
5
−0
.1
3
−0
.4
1
−0
.7
8
−0
.3
6
−0
.5
4
−1
.0
3
−0
.1
4
D
C
1
2
,D
C
1
3
D
C
2
1
,D
C
2
3
S
u
p
1
,S
u
p
2
S
u
p
1
,S
u
p
2
3
7
.3
3
−1
2
.1
1
E
X
.1
1
(+
5
0
%
)
1
2
.9
9
−0
.1
6
−0
.2
7
−0
.1
2
−0
.5
9
−0
.6
4
−0
.3
9
−0
.6
7
−1
.1
0
−0
.1
8
D
C
1
1
,D
C
1
3
D
C
2
1
,D
C
2
3
S
u
p
1
,S
u
p
2
S
u
p
1
,S
u
p
2
4
0
.2
−1
7
.0
4
T
ab
le
5.
7:
C
h
an
ge
s
in
th
e
re
su
lt
s
of
E
x
am
p
le
s
2-
11
co
m
p
ar
ed
to
th
e
re
su
lt
of
th
e
eff
ec
ti
ve
ta
x
ra
te
$7
7
117
improving fuel consumptions achieves that reduction at lower costs.
In order to analyze the effects of electricity emission factor and costs, we build
Examples 22−31 which have the same data presented in Tables 5.1-5.3 except that
we decrease the emission factor of electricity in Examples 22 − 26 by 10% each
time and decrease the electricity costs in Examples 27− 31 by 10% each time. The
results of Examples 22 − 31 in Table 5.9 show that decreasing the emission factor
of electricity increases tax rates. The achieved reduction in the emission factor and
total costs are found to be higher compared to the result of the effective tax rate $77.
The results of Examples 22−25 indicate that Firms maintain the same supply chain
and increases the percentage use of electric trucks. When the electricity emission
factor is decreased by 50%, Firm 1 changes the configuration of its network and
opens DC 1 instead of DC 2 to benefit from electric trucks. The results of Examples
27 − 31 show that decreasing electricity cost has the same impacts on the firms’
decisions and the tax rates; it increases the tax rates, decreases the CO2 emissions
and emission factor at lower costs, and increases the percentage use of electric
trucks. Comparing the impacts of changing all the previous parameters, we found
that the one that achieves lower overall emissions and emission factors at lower
costs is reducing the fuel consumption of class-8-diesel truck.
5.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we presented a bilevel programming model to integrate the design
of supply chains into the design of a carbon tax policy based on the emission
factor. At the upper level, the government sets a target emission factor per product
transported and taxes firms if they exceed that level. Therefore, the government
118
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is interested in finding the best tax rate that achieves the target reduction. At
the lower level, firms make decisions regarding the design of their supply chain
and the type of trucks used. Due to the difficulty of the bilevel problem as it has
nonlinearities in the upper-level problem as well as binary and integer variables in
the lower-level problem, we find the tax rate α2 that achieves the target reduction
by fixing α2 in the lower-level problem, solving the resulting MIP for several values
of α2, and picking the one that achieves the target reduction and has the lowest
impact on the industry. In order to test the proposed model, we constructed a case
study and tested the impact of some parameters using several examples.
The results indicate that a reduction in the transport-related emission factor
reduces the overall emissions by almost the same percentage. We found that firms
reduce their emission factors by opening more DCs that are close to customers, use
domestic and offshore suppliers, utilize large trucks, and use electric trucks. By
comparing the carbon tax based on the emission factor to the carbon tax imposed
on the total emissions, we found that for tax rates ranging between 0$ and $60,
the differences in the achieved emission factors and overall emissions are small.
However, the carbon tax imposed on the total emissions significantly increases the
total cost. By varying some of the parameters, we found that the reduction in
the total emissions and the emission factors achieved from increasing fuel cost and
decreasing fuel consumption are higher than the ones obtained from varying other
parameters. The results demonstrate that improving the cost and the capacity of
electric trucks would induce firms to use them more; however, improving the fuel
consumption of heavy-duty diesel trucks would result in more reduction at lower
costs.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
In this thesis, we model and study an intensity-based carbon tax that targets the
emission factor due to production or transportation activities. Specifically, we study
a carbon tax scheme where policy makers set a target emission factor for a specific
industry and tax firms if they exceed that limit.
In Chapter 3, we propose a social welfare maximization model for an intensity-
based carbon tax that targets the production emission factor of manufacturing
industries represented by cement industry. The policy is tested on case studies
constructed in the context of the cement industry and is compared to other envi-
ronmental policies. Unlike the major criticism of the intensity-based regulations,
which is that the total emissions would increase even if the target level for the
emission factor is met, our analysis indicates that a reduction in the emission fac-
tor would lead to a significant reduction in the total emissions. Yet, our study shows
that using a low tax rate would result in no reduction or a minimal reduction in the
emission factor and the total emissions. Comparing the carbon tax based on the
emission factor to other environmental policies, we found that the policy has more
advantages: (1) it yields the highest consumers’ surplus and production quantities
and the lowest market price; (2) it provides social welfare that is significantly higher
than the ones obtained under the mandatory cap on the emission factor and under
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the carbon tax based on the total emissions; (3) it provides adequate reduction in
CO2 emissions with a little impact on social welfare; and (4) it provides a stable
price for carbon credits.
In Chapter 3, the best tax rate is found by enumeration. In Chapter 4, we
propose a bilevel formulation to design a carbon tax policy based on the production
emission factor of a manufacturing industry. At the upper level, the government
sets a target level for the production emission factor of the industry and taxes firms
if they exceed that target. Assuming a competitive market, at the lower level, the
industry decides on the production quantity and the fuel types that maximize the
social welfare given the tax rate and the market price. After testing the transformed
model on several examples, constructed in the context of the cement industry,
we find that the proposed model finds the optimal tax rate that induces firms to
reduce their emission factors and consequently reduces the overall emissions. Higher
reduction in the emission factors significantly increases the tax rates, decreases the
social welfare and production quantities, and may put some firms out of business.
On the other hand, adequate reduction in the emission factors, below 20%, is
achievable with moderate tax rates that have a little impact on the industry and
lead to a large reduction in the overall emissions.
To examine the effectiveness of the policy on reducing the CO2 emissions of
a different polluting industry, in Chapter 5, we present a bilevel formulation to
integrate the design of supply chains into the design of a carbon tax policy based
on the emission factor. At the upper level, the government sets a target emission
factor per product transported and taxes firms if they exceed that level. Therefore,
the government is interested in finding the best tax rate that achieves the target
reduction. At the lower level, firms make decisions regarding the design of their
supply chain and the type of trucks used. Because of the difficulty of the bilevel
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problem as it has nonlinearities in the upper-level problem as well as binary and
integer variables in the lower-level problem, we use an alternative approach to find
the tax rate that achieves the target reduction. We fix the value of the tax rate in the
lower-level problem, solve the resulting mixed integer program for several tax rates,
and pick the one that achieves the target reduction and has the lowest impact on the
industry. To test the proposed model, we construct a case study and test the impact
of some parameters using several examples. The results show that the effective
tax rate induces firms to reduce their emission factors and consequently decreases
the overall emissions by almost the same percentage. Firms reduce their emission
factors by redesigning their supply chain, utilizing large trucks, and using electric
trucks. The results also indicate that improving the fuel consumption of heavy-
duty diesel trucks could be an alternative to using electric trucks as the reduction
achieved by decreasing the fuel consumption is higher than the one obtained from
improving the cost and the capacity of electric trucks. Future research will focus
on investigating the impact of the policy on different market structures; namely,
monopolistic and oligopolistic markets and on constructing an efficient solution
methodology for the model proposed in Chapter 5 to find the best tax rate.
124
APPENDICES
125
Appendix A
Chapter-3 Notation
Indices i : Index for firms, i ∈ 1, ..., N.
l : Fuel type l ∈ 1, ..., L.
Parameters ci : Variable cost per unit produced at firm i.
ti : Constant associated with the quadratic cost at firm i.
hil : Fuel l cost at firm i.
di : Production capacity at firm i.
bi : Thermal energy consumption at firm i (GJ/tonne).
bˆil : Energy content in fuel l at firm i (GJ/tonne, m
3...).
eil : CO2 emission factor of fuel type l at firm i.
β : A target production emission factor above which
firms pay tax.
γ : Intercept of inverse demand curve.
δ : Slope of inverse demand curve.
Variables qi : Quantity produced at firm i.
qd : Quantity demanded in the market.
wil : Amount of fuel l used at firm i.
xi : Production emission factor for firm i.
θi : Taxed CO2 emissions of firm i.
p : Product market price.
p¯ : Permit price.
ai : Clinker to cement ratio at firm i (t-clinker/t-cement).
aˆi : Raw material to clinker ratio at firm i (t-raw-meal/t-clinker)
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si : Emission factor due to calcining limestone (t-CO2/t-clinker).
ξi : Emission factor due to grinding raw materials (t-CO2/t-raw-meal).
ξˆi : Emission factor due to grinding cement (t-CO2/t-cement).
α2 : Tax rate.
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Appendix B
Chapter-4 Notation
Indices i : Index for firms, i ∈ 1, ..., N.
l : Fuel type l ∈ 1, ..., L.
Parameters ci : Variable cost per unit produced at firm i.
ti : Constant associated with the quadratic cost at firm i.
hil : Fuel l cost at firm i.
di : Production capacity at firm i.
bi : Thermal energy consumption at firm i (GJ/tonne).
bˆil : Energy content in fuel l at firm i (GJ/tonne, m
3...).
eil : CO2 emission factor of fuel type l at firm i.
β : A target production emission factor above which
firms pay tax.
γ : Intercept of inverse demand curve.
δ : Slope of inverse demand curve.
Lower-level variables qi : Quantity produced at firm i.
qd : Quantity demanded in the market.
wil : Amount of fuel l used at firm i.
xi : Production emission factor for firm i.
θi : Taxed CO2 emissions of firm i.
p : Product market price.
ri : Dual variables associated with capacity constraints.
λi : Dual variables associated with energy constraints.
ζi : Dual variables associated with taxed emissions
constraints.
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Upper-level variables E : Production emission factor for the entire industry.
σ0 : Deviation from the target emission factor.
s0 : Deviation from the total emissions.
α2 : Tax rate.
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Appendix C
Chapter-5 Notation
Indices i : Index for firms, i ∈ 1, ..., N.
Mi : Shipping points of firm i, m ∈ {1, ...,M i}
Ki : Customer zones of firm i, k ∈ {1, ..., Ki} .
Ji : Potential distribution center locations
of firm i, j ∈ {1, ..., Ji} .
Li : Truck types of firm i, l ∈ {1, ..., Li}
Parameters cimjl : Average production and shipping cost per
unit shipped from shipping point m ∈Mi
to DC j ∈ Ji using truck l ∈ Li.
cˆijkl : Average handling cost per unit shipped from DC
j ∈ Ji to customer zone k ∈ Ki using truck l ∈ Li.
sij : Capacity limit of DC j of firm i.
fij : Fixed cost of opening DC j of firm i.
hil : Fuel or electricity cost ($/Liter, MWh, ..)
of truck l at firm i.
dik : Demand at customer zone k of firm i.
bil : Fuel or electricity consumption (Liter, MWh/km)
for a loaded truck l at firm i.
bˆil : Fuel or electricity consumption (Liter, MWh/km)
for an empty truck l at firm i.
sˆil : Capacity of truck l at firm i.
timjl : Fixed costs of shipments from shipping points
m ∈Mi to DC j ∈ Ji using truck l ∈ Li at firm i.
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tˆijkl : Fixed cost of a shipment from DC j ∈ Ji to
customer zone k ∈ Ki using truck l ∈ Li at firm i.
aimj : Distance from shipping point m ∈Mi to DC j ∈ Ji
of firm i.
aˆijk : Distance from DC j ∈ Ji to customer zone k ∈ Ki
of firm i.
eil : CO2 emission factor (kg/Liter, MWh) for the electricity
or the fuels used for truck l ∈ Li at firm i.
eˆim Emission factor of the transportation mode used to deliver
the product to the shipping point m ∈Mi of firm i.
β : A target production emission factor above which
firms pay tax.
Lower-level qimjl : Quantity shipped from shipping point m ∈Mi to
variables DC j ∈ Ji using truck l ∈ Li at firm i.
qˆijkl : Quantity shipped from DC j ∈ Ji to customer zone
k ∈ Ki using truck l ∈ Li at firm i.
wimjl : Fuel/electricity used by truck l ∈ Li to deliver shipments
between shipping point m ∈Mi and DC j ∈ Ji of firm i.
wˆijkl : Fuel/electricity used by truck l ∈ Li to deliver shipments
between DC j ∈ Ji and customer zone k ∈ Ki of firm i.
vimjl : Number of shipments between shipping point m ∈Mi
and DC j ∈ Ji using truck l ∈ Li at firm i.
vˆijkl : Number of shipments between DC j ∈ Ji and customer
zone k ∈ Ki using truck l ∈ Li at firm i.
yij : Binary variable that equals 1 if DC j ∈ Ji is opened and
0 otherwise.
TEi : Total emissions for firm i.
xi : Production emission factor for firm i.
Upper-level E : Production emission factor for the entire industry.
variables α2 : Tax rate.
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